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THE ETHICS OF INSIDER TRADING
GARY LAWSON*
The quickest way to become famous is often to become infa-
mous, as arbitrageur Ivan Boesky has recently discovered. Prior
to November 1986, Mr. Boesky was well-known within the fi-
nancial community, but largely unknown outside it. That
changed dramatically following revelations that he and Dennis
Levine, a merger specialist with the investment banking firm of
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., had made tens of millions of
dollars in the stock market by using Mr. Levine's advance
knowledge of impending takeovers by Drexel clients. Today,
after disgorging $50 million in profits, paying $50 million in
penalties, and receiving a jail sentence,' Mr. Boesky is a living
symbol of one of the least admired, and least understood, fi-
nancial practices in America: insider stock trading. Legal and
moral condemnation is heaped upon insider trading with un-
common hostility,2 and often with little discrimination: Legal
prosecution and social opprobrium await both the corporate
manager caught trading on information about his own firm and
the investment banker caught trading on information regarding
his clients. In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has cast an increasingly broad net for persons trading
on nonpublic information,3 and there are no signs that its en-
thusiasm or moral fervor are dampening.4 While other forms of
business conduct, such as price fixing, are also subject to both
* John M. Olin Research Fellow, Yale Law School. I am grateful to the Program in
Civil Liability at Yale Law School and the Institute for Humane Studies for support in
the making of this article.
1. See SEC v. Boesky, No. 86 Civ. 8767 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986); Wall St.J., Nov. 17,
1986, at 1, col. 6.
2. See Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago School,"
1986 DUKE LJ. 628, 628 ("American jurisprudence abhors insider trading with a fervor
reserved for those who scoff at motherhood, apple pie, and baseball.") (footnote
omitted).
3. See Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1987, at 20, col. 3 ("Since 1981, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission has brought 125 insider trading cases, as compared with 77 during
the previous 47 years."). The net has snared, inter alia, investment analysts, see Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); football coaches, see SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D.
Okla. 1984); and financial columnists, see Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316
(1987), although the federal courts cut short the fishing expedition in the first two
cases.
4. A 1987 editorial by former SEC chairman John Shad, warning of increased gov-
ernment enforcement efforts, carried the imposing title Insider-Trading Caveat: In the
End, Only Ethics Pays. Wall St.J., Feb. 6, 1987, at 20, col. 3.
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criminal prosecution and widespread public disapproval, none
seem to raise moral hackles in quite the same way as insider
stock trading. A systematic treatment of the moral issues that
arise, or have been thought to arise, from insider trading may
therefore prove useful in understanding and evaluating this
phenomenon.
In the nearly three decades since the Commission began us-
ing Rule lOb-55 to restrain stock trading on nonpublic informa-
tion, a wealth of literature on the subject has been produced.
The catalyst was Professor Henry Manne's 1966 book Insider
Trading and the Stock Market,' which argued that transactions of
the sort then coming under legal scrutiny-trading by corpo-
rate employees on advance knowledge of favorable new infor-
5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). Rule lOb-5 proscribes the use in interstate com-
merce of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud ... or ... any act, practice, or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security." Id. at § 240.10b-5(a), (c). The rule was
promulgated in 1942 pursuant to section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, which outlaws the "use or employ[ment], in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance .... " 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). The first intimation that the Commission viewed this rule as a
general prohibition against trading on nonpublic information came in a 1961 enforce-
ment action against an agent of a broker-dealer. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). A federal appellate court approved an even broader application
(and thereby gave a formal go-ahead to both the Commission and private plaintiffs)
seven years later. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). As a matter of statutory interpretation, the use of section
10(b) to regulate insider trading is at best a dubious enterprise, see Dooley, Enforcement
of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 56-59 (1980); Easterbrook, Insider Trading,
Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REV.
309, 317-20, though the damage by now is surely irreversible. Similar problems may
plague Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1987), which prohibits insider trading in
connection with tender offers. See Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property
Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 79, 87-88, 113 (1987).
Other, more limited forms of regulation stand on surer legal footing. Section 16(b)
of the 1934 Act explicitly allows corporations to recover profits from short-swing
purchases and sales of their shares by statutorily defined insiders. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1982). Some states have common law rules requiring corporate insiders to
disclose information concerning their firms to shareholders in certain face-to-face stock
transactions, even in the absence of an inquiry from the outsider. See, e.g., Dawson v.
National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916) (officers and directors trad-
ing in shares of their company have a fiduciary duty of disclosure to their sharehold-
ers); Fisher v. Pennsylvania Life Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 506, 138 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1977)
(duty to disclose when the insider stands in a special relationship of trust to the outside
shareholder). Even these rules, however, have not generally extended to the use of
nonpublic information in impersonal transactions on exchanges. See Bainbridge, The
Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 35, 38 (1986);
Walker, The Duty of Disclosure by a Director Purchasing Stock from His Stockholders, 32 YALE L.
J. 637, 640-41 (1923). But see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78,
248 N.E.2d 910 (1969).
6. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
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mation about their firms7 -- improve market efficiency,' can be a
necessary and appropriate means of compensating corporate
entrepreneurs, 9 and cannot be prevented anyway.10 Professor
Manne's call for a critical examination of the rationale for re-
straints on insider stock trading brought forth a flood of aca-
demic comment,"1 to which Professor Manne responded in
1970.12 Following this brief flurry, interest in the underlying
justification of rules against insider trading seemed to wane
during the 1970s, as federal regulation of the practice became a
fait accompli and legal attention turned to the details of regula-
tion under Rule 1Ob-5. " The discussion was revived late in the
1970s, however, in the wake of the government's ultimately un-
successful criminal prosecution of Vincent Chiarella, an em-
ployee of a financial printer, for trading on advance knowledge
of takeovers about to be undertaken by his firm's clients.' 4 Be-
cause Mr. Chiarella was far removed from the sort of person
ordinarily thought of as an insider-the directors, officers, and
7. Professor Manne's book issued just as the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur case, involv-
ing the discovery of a fabulously rich ore deposit, was making its way through the
courts. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
8. H. MANNE, supra note 6, at 77-110.
9. IE at 111-58.
10. Id. at 163-69.
11. See Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 720;
Mendelson, The Economics ofInsider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470 (1969);
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967); Baum, Book Review, 1967 DUKE L. J. 456; Garrett, Book
Review, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 465 (1968);Jennings, Book Review, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1229
(1967); Kripke, Book Review, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (1967); Marsh, Book Review, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1317 (1968); Painter, Book Review, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 146 (1966);
Poser, Book Review, 53 VA. L. REV. 753 (1967); Sommer, Book Review, 54 A.B.A.J. 692
(1968); Vogt, Book Review, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 520 (1967); Weston, Book Review, 35
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 140 (1966); Wright, Book Review, 21 Sw. L.J. 405 (1967).
12. See Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547 (1970)
[hereinafter Law Professors]. Professor Manne's response provoked a further exchange
between himself and the SEC's solicitor. See Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A
Response to Prof. Manne, 23 VAND. L. REV. 621 (1970); Manne, A Rejoinder to Mr. Ferber, 23
VAND. L. REV. 627 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only
purchasers or sellers of securities can bring private causes of action under section
10(b)); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (no damages liability under
section 10(b) in the absence of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud); Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (unless deception or manipulation is
involved, section 10(b) does not prevent majority shareholders from freezing out a
minority, even in breach of a fiduciary duty). During this period, a number of courts
also refused to impose common law liability for the use of nonpublic information in
impersonal exchange transactions. See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978)
(applying Indiana law); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 1975).
14. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), rev'g 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir.
1978).
730 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 11
large shareholders subject to section 16 of the Securities and
Exchange Act' 5-this case made especially clear the need for
consideration of the purposes, effects, and limits of anti-insider
trading rules. The result has been a "second wave" of scholar-
ship paying increasing attention to some of the broad theoreti-
cal aspects of insider stock trading.' 6
Both the first (post-Manne) and second (post-Chiarella) waves
of scholarship are predominantly concerned with the economic
issues raised by Professor Manne in 1966. However, the ques-
tion of the "fairness" of insider stock trading has haunted dis-
cussions of the subject from an early date and refuses to go
away. Both the pre-Manne and first-wave eras were heavily
tinged with moralism, but ethical analysis did not get much be-
yond simple expressions of disapproval, whether in
academia, 7 the legislature,'" or the courts.1 9 Professor Manne
15. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982).
16. See, e.g., Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on Nonpub-
lic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101 (1984); Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider
Trading, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341 (1982); Bainbridge, supra note 5; Barry, The Economics
of Outside Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307 (1981); Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV.
322 (1979); Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857
(1983); Cox, supra note 2; Dooley, supra note 5; Easterbrook, supra note 5; Haddock &
Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1449 (1986); Levmore,
Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982);
Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 9 (1984); Morgan, supra note 5; Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Dis-
closure and Corporate Privacy, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980); Solinga, A Proposed New Regime
of Insider Trading Regulation, 14 SEC. REG. LJ. 99 (1986); Titus & Carroll, Netting the
Outsider: The Need for a Broader Restatement of Insider Trading Doctrine, 8 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 127 (1986); Warren, Who's Suing Who? A Commentary on Investment Bankers and the
Misappropriation Theory, 46 MD. L. REV. 1222 (1987); Wimberly, Corporate Recovery of In-
sider Trading Profits at Common Law, 8 CORP. L. REV. 197 (1985); Note, Insider Trading at
Common Law, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 838 (1984). This list includes only those works cited
elsewhere in this article; a full list is easily twice as long.
17. The tone was set by Professor Wilgus in an early treatment of duties of disclo-
sure in face-to-face stock transactions:
That the director may take advantage of his position to secure the profits that
all have won, offends the moral sense; no shareholder expects to be so treated
by the director he selects; no director would urge his friends to select him for
that reason; that the law yet allows him to do this, does more to discourage
legitimate investment in corporate shares than almost anything else, and al-
lows the fiction of the corporate entity to obstruct instead of advance justice.
Wilgus, Purchase of Shares of Corporation by a Director from a Shareholder, 8 Micn. L. REV.
267, 297 (1910). See also Lake, The Use for Personal Profit of Knowledge Gained While a Direc-
tor, 9 Miss. L. J. 427, 444 (1937) ("Conscience condemns the director who acquires
information of facts materially affecting the value of the stock through his position, and
who buys from his fellow shareholder without disclosing it.") (discussing face-to-face
transactions); Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Informa-
tion by Insiders, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 468, 468 (1947) ("The invidious character of such
trading is emphasized by the fact that the profit so obtained by the managers was not
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disparagingly, but accurately, described the writings of this pe-
riod as consisting of " 'it's just not right' propositions,' 20 so
named for "an anonymous law student, who, during a class-
room discussion of the subject, stamped her foot and angrily
declaimed, 'I don't care; it's just not right.' "21
disclosed to the real owners of the corporation, to wit, the stockholders, and because it
was often obtained at their expense."). Professor Manne's 1966 defense of insider
trading was subjected to a moral barrage in the ensuing five years which, if anything,
was even less enlightening. See Ferber, supra note 12, at 622 (economic analysis of in-
sider trading is essentially irrelevant because in enacting section 10(b) "Congress was
attempting to improve the morality of the marketplace"); Garrett, supra note 11, at 470
("[a] lawyer can hardly resist the conclusion that what appears to be a clear evil should
not be condoned for the sake of an economic theory");Jennings, supra note 11, at 1234
("inside information ... fairly belongs to all of the shareholders"); Loss, The Fiduciary
Concept As Applied to Trading by Corporate "Insiders" in the United States, 33 MOD. L. Rzv. 34,
36 (1970) (decrying Professor Manne's "apparent scorn for the moral element"); Men-
delson, supra note 11, at 492 (economic objections to insider trading are "reinforced by
considerations of fairness"); Painter, Rule lOb-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST.JoHN'S
L. REv. 699, 714 (1971) (insider trading "is simply not right although we may not be
precisely sure why this is so") (footnote omitted); Poser, supra note 11, at 754 ("Manne
believes that an 'analysis' is needed in order to determine whether insider trading
should be prohibited"); Schotland, supra note 11, at 1429 ("It seems paradoxical that
we should be urged to reverse the views and law with which we have moved into today's
prosperity and, now that we have unprecedented resources for effectuating our views
of fairness, that we should be urged to allow-indeed, to encourage-practices long
deemed unfair and unlawful"); Weston, supra note 11, at 145 (insider trading "results
in an inequitable transfer of wealth from outsiders to insiders"). These are not the
conclusions of the moral arguments advanced by these authors; they are the arguments.
18. The Senate Report accompanying the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act decried
"the unscrupulous employment of inside information" by officers, directors, and large
shareholders, whose positions "enable[d] them to acquire and profit by information
not available to others." S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934). The House
Report similarly spoke of the "[e]xploitation of ... ignorance by self-perpetuating
managements in possession of inside information," H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5-6 (1934), and declared that "men charged with the administration of other peo-
ple's money must not use inside information for their own advantage." Id. at 13. That
was as much explanation of the immorality and unfairness of insider trading as Con-
gress provided. See H. MANNE, supra note 6, at 8-10.
19. In the context of face-to-face transactions between officers or directors and
shareholders, see Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 375, 157 N.W. 929,
933 (1916) ("a knowledge of the law is not required to enable one to appreciate the
moral wrong perpetrated by a corporate officer with knowledge acquired by virtue of
his position in profiting on the ignorance of a stockholder."); Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal.
App. 2d 371, 381, 159 P.2d 980, 984-85 (1945) (the majority rule of no duty of disclo-
sure even in face-to-face transactions "offends the moral sense, and is contrary to our
modem concept of the duty of a director towards those he represents"). In none of
these cases did analysis proceed beyond a bare assertion of moral wrongdoing. Early
federal cases and administrative decisions were much to the same effect. See, e.g., Speed
v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). See generally Macey, supra note 16, at 13-19 (thoroughly discuss-
ing the fairness rationale underlying the early development of the use of Rule 1Ob-5 to
regulate insider trading).
20. H. MANNE, supra note 6, at 15.
21. I at 233 n.42. Professor Manne was even less charitable with respect to the
moral arguments advanced against his book. In his 1970 response to critics, he began a
section entitled (and one can hear the sigh) Morals, Morals, Morals by complaining:
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Second-wave writers have addressed moral issues with some-
what more care,2 2 but even they have not, as a rule, done more
than to identify some very general moral premises or ap-
proaches that can be used to analyze insider stock trading.
While that alone is a quantum leap beyond what came before it,
the persistent vagueness of moral argumentation in this area
makes analysis of the issue extraordinarily difficult. Nonethe-
less, the extant arguments are a valuable starting point insofar
as they provide useful insight into the kinds of moral questions
that insider trading is typically seen to raise.23 Some of these
questions arise from the specific character of stock transactions,
but most involve broad issues concerning trading on superior
information that cannot be limited to such a narrow context. In
general, there is no evident reason why trading on superior in-
formation concerning stock values should be thought to raise
different moral issues than trading on superior information
concerning any other commodity, such as a house with a con-
cealed defect, a shipload of corn, or a hogshead of tobacco-all
of which have received considerable attention in the moral and
legal literature on contracts. Appropriately, the ethical argu-
ments traditionally advanced in this wider context largely paral-
lel the arguments found in the literature specifically dealing
with insider stock trading. Those arguments, whether their
proponents recognize it or not, raise some of the most long-
lived and fundamental problems of moral philosophy, which
have little to do with the intricacies of the stock exchange.
"Morals, someone once said, are a private luxury. Carried into the arena of serious
debate on public policy, moral arguments are frequently either a sham or a refuge for
the intellectually bankrupt." Law Professors, supra note 12, at 549. See also id. at 548
("The 'discovery' of ethical and moral issues and a recurrent insistence on this ap-
proach strike me more as ?n outgrowth of frustration than of cogent analysis."); id. at
557 ("Moral fervor, whether held by fundamentalist ministers, or by law professors, is
not easily shaken by rational argument."); id. at 581 ("Moral indignation is [often] used
as a cover for unanalyzed conclusions."); id. ("The main trouble with moral escalation
is that it is so frequently fatuous."). Of one critic who said to him personally, " 'We
didn't need any book on insider trading. I know it's wrong, and that's all there is to
it,' "id, Professor Manne commented: "As far as I know.., no one has adduced actual
evidence that this person is God." Id.
22. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 55-61; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 16, at
880-82; Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 324-30; Macey, supra note 16, at 15-19. Interest-
ingly, none of these more careful writers are openly sympathetic to moral arguments
against insider stock trading. Far from it.
23. One can also find references to ethics or fairness in modem cases and congres-
sional reports, but they contain no useful analysis. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,
654, 661 n.21 (1983); id. at 672-73, 676-77 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); H.R. REP. No.
355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1983).
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Of course, I do not purport to resolve those age-old
problems here. It is enough for now merely to identify the
kinds of issues that proponents of the various moral ap-
proaches to insider trading need to address if their positions
are to be taken seriously. I suggest, as does much of the current
literature, that insider trading can profitably be understood as a
question of property rights in information, 24 and I outline a
possible normative foundation for a property rights view that
would condemn insider trading that makes use of someone
else's information without his consent. So understood, the eth-
ics of insider trading are merely a particular, and unexcep-
tional, application of wider moral principles governing
marketplace transactions, and one's ethical views of the prac-
tice are likely to be determined by one's general perspective on
the morality of markets.25
I. Is INSIDER TRADING ALWAYS WRONG?
When most people speak of insider trading, they have in
mind transactions involving stocks or other securities. A person
who buys a rare work of art, knowing more about it than the
seller, is not generally thought of as an inside trader, and he is
not likely to be criminally pursued by a Paintings and Sculp-
tures Commission. An economist would find this puzzling. The
economist conceives insider trading to be "trading by parties
who are better informed than their trading partners. Thus, in-
sider trading in an economic sense includes all trades where
information is asymmetric."'26 Nothing in this definition sug-
24. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 16, at 863-66; Easterbrook, supra note 5, at
331-38; Macey, supra note 16, at 30-47, 63-64; Morgan, supra note 5, at 80.
25. Throughout this discussion, I speak of "morality," "ethics," and "fairness" in-
terchangeably, and do not distinguish among comments that other people have made
using any of these terms. This may obscure an important distinction between moral
arguments. Moral statements can be either claims concerning proper individual con-
duct or claims concerning rights (or both). For example, saying that it is morally permis-
sible for A to do X can mean either that a code of individual conduct applicable to A
gives moral sanction to X or that no one is entitled to prevent A from doing X. If it
means the latter, then doing X may still be morally wrong for A; his right to do it does
not make it right for him to do so. See Thomasson, Rights, Justice, and Discrimination, 11
HARV.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 805 (1988). Thus, when someone says that X is immoral, one
cannot conclude that he means that X should be illegal. And by the same token, some-
one who does not believe that X should be illegal may nonetheless mean that he does
not think it immoral. My focus here is on principles of individual conduct, but because
the arguments of other writers often move quickly from law to policy to ethics and back
again, the distinction between right and rights at times is unavoidably blurred.
26. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 16, at 860.
No. 3] 733
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gests any special emphasis on stock transactions. Nor does it
presuppose any special relationship between the traders: A per-
son is an economic insider merely by virtue of knowing some-
thing about his own intentions that his (perhaps faceless)
trading partner does not know, but would consider relevant if
he did.27 Any contract in which there is less than full effective
equality of information between the parties is an instance of
insider trading. Of course, in fashioning legal rules one might
conclude that the special role that capital markets play in the
economy justifies treating insider stock trading differently than
insider sculpture trading. One might even find moral differences
if one has a purely consequentialist moral outlook-premised,
for example, on maximizing wealth, utility, or pleasure-and
the macroeconomic effects of insider stock trading and insider
sculpture trading are seen to be materially different. But any
moral theory not based on some form of "macroconsequential-
ism" will have a difficult time finding morally relevant distinc-
tions between transactions involving stocks and other
commodities. An unqualified moral objection to "insider trad-
ing" in its broad sense will therefore find fault with any failure
of one trading party to insure that the other is as informed as
he about all material aspects of the transaction. The moral
wrongfulness of trading on inside information regarding stock
values is then a special case of a more general principle applica-
ble to all contracts premised on asymmetrical information.
Two writers generally critical of attempts to analyze insider
stock trading in moral terms, Judge Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Manne, have recognized, but quickly dismissed, the
possibility that someone could use a sweeping condemnation
of informational inequality as a predicate for moral disapproval
of insider stock trading. In perhaps the most ambitious of the
second-wave attempts to address moral objections to insider
stock trading, Judge Easterbrook has examined four possible
conceptions of unfairness in that context, all of which he finds
27. This "materiality" requirement should not be confused with the legal require-
ment of materiality under the federal securities laws. A fact is material for purposes of
the proxy rules under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), and the
insider trading rules "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S.
Ct. 978, 983 (1988); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
Economic materiality is determined by the subjective mental state of the individual
actor: If someone deems the position of the planets or what his trading partner had for
breakfast to be relevant to his investment decisions, then those facts are material.
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wanting either because of substantive inadequacies or because
they do not seem to reflect what those who express fairness
concerns have in mind. Two of those conceptions-that unfair-
ness may result when nondisclosure leads to trading at "incor-
rect" prices that do not fully reflect all existing information,28
and that "it is unfair for one person to trade with another un-
less the two are equally knowledgeable about the subject of the
deal" 2 9-amount to condemnations of all informational ine-
quality.30 Judge Easterbrook rejects these egalitarian concep-
tions as inconsistent with principles of contract law, which
permit trading on some informational disparities31; as destruc-
tive of incentives to produce valuable information3 2; and as in-
consistent with most people's moral sense, which "accept[s] as
fair the fact that people trade on some kinds of informational
advantages."13 3 Professor Manne has treated such arguments
even more brusquely. Like Judge Easterbrook, he observes that
trading on superior information is generally permitted as a
matter of contract law. And like Judge Easterbrook, he per-
ceives such trading to be well within most people's understand-
ing of fairness. Consider the case of a corporation purchasing
land, either as a location for a new plant or because of valuable
mineral deposits that it knows lie beneath the property. "Typi-
cally, with all the secrecy of the CIA planning an assassination,
the company will send its agents out to purchase land as dis-
creetly as possible."34 Not only are these transactions legal in
the absence of affirmative misrepresentations, but when he
28. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 326.
29. Id. at 329.
30. Judge Easterbrook also suggests that unfairness in stock trading might mean un-
equal treatment for shareholders, as when some shareholders sell their shares to insid-
ers possessing undisclosed good news while others retain their shares, see id. at 324, or
the obtaining of gains by insiders that would otherwise go to shareholders. See id. at
327. He rejects the first definition because there is no good reason to think that trading
by insiders causes selling shareholders to sell. Even if it does, as Professor Scott earlier
pointed out, see Scott, supra note 16, at 808-09, the possibility that an outsider will
eventually trade against better-informed insiders will have been anticipated by the mar-
ket and reflected ex ante in share prices. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 324-26. The
second definition begs the question by assuming that it is somehow wrong or unfair for
managerial insiders to receive a portion of their compensation in the form of trading
profits. See id. at 327-29. Judge Easterbrook concludes that attempts to define fairness
and to construct arguments against insider trading based upon it "get us nowhere." Id
at 330.
31. See id. at 326 ("The law of contracts permits such trading. It is called shrewd
bargaining").
32. See id. at 330.
33. Id. at 326.
34. Law Professors, supra note 12, at 550.
No. 3)
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
wrote these words in 1970 Professor Manne did "not know of
any commentator who has ever classified this as immoral con-
duct."" Lawyers, he warns, "should be very circumspect about
characterizing the utilization of superior information as im-
moral. That is, after all, their stock in trade."36
Nonetheless, that is precisely what some lawyers-or at least
some legal scholars and moralists-have done. Professor
Levmore, almost as though in explicit defiance of Professor
Manne and Judge Easterbrook, has embraced a strong form of
the "equality of information" conception of fairness, defining
transactions as fair "when insiders and outsiders are in equal
positions. That is, a system is fair if we would not expect one
group to envy the position of the other."3 7 In other words, fair-
ness requires the absence of insider trading in the economic
sense. This moral conception is "attractive, ' 3 Professor
Levmore argues, because it reflects "the 'golden rule' of inter-
personal behavior-treating others as we would ourselves,"
39
which he takes to underlie traditional fiduciary concepts.
Because the notion of a legal rule forbidding all trading on
superior information strikes the Anglo-American legal mind as
absurd, it is easy to give arguments such as Professor
Levmore's a casual dismissal. That is a serious mistake. While
Professor Levmore has not sought to ground his view of fair-
ness in a wider philosophical tradition, he is by no means the
first person broadly to question the morality of trading on su-
perior information. Professor Manne and Judge Easterbrook,
in assuming that no one would ever condemn all insider trad-
ing as immoral, do not adequately distinguish between legal
and ethical rules. Anglo-American contract law has never for-
bidden all trading in the absence of full disclosure,4" and, to
35. Id.
36. Id. at 551.
37. Levmore, supra note 16, at 122 (footnote omitted). Recognizing that this ideal,
while having the virtue of clear definition, is perhaps too "ambitious" and "elusive,"
id., to serve as a legal standard, Professor Levmore uses it solely as one ground of
comparison (along with economic costs and benefits) of alternative regulatory patterns.
38. Levmore, supra note 16, at 122.
39. Id at 122-23.
40. A discussion of precisely when the law forbids such trading is beyond the scope
of this article. The most thorough treatment of the issue from an economic standpoint
is Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. I
(1978). See also G. BOWER, THE LAW RELATING TO ACTIONABLE NoN-DIsCLOSURE AND
OTHER BREACHES OF DUTY IN RELATIONS OF CONFIDENCE AND INFLUENCE (1915); 2 J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES §§ 482-91 (4th ed. 1840); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 204-12 (3d ed. 1842); W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
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paraphrase Professor Manne, I know of no modem commenta-
tor who has suggested that it should. Professor Levmore in par-
ticular does not go nearly that far.4 As both he and Judge
Easterbrook point out, and as many of the older authorities
recognized,42 a rule of law invalidating all trades based on
asymmetrical information would have substantial effects on in-
centives to produce valuable information. But behind the legal
veneer one finds an ancient and powerful tradition of moral sus-
picion of all trading on informational disparities, which the law
has, sometimes unhappily, suppressed in the interest of com-
mercial efficiency. Those who find it hard to take Professor
Levmore's moral position seriously should consider that the in-
tellectual history of the ethics of "insider trading" does not be-
gin in 1910,4 3 or even with the birth of the modem
corporation, but in the first century B.C., and it begins right
where Professor Levmore has picked up.
A. An Intellectual History of the Ethics of Informational Equality
The morality of insider trading, in its economic sense of trad-
ing on asymmetrical information, has been the subject of spir-
ited debate among philosophers and legal scholars for
centuries. The issue was raised over two thousand years ago by
Cicero in a passage that was once a jurisprudential classic but
has all but vanished from modem scholarship.44 In order to
explore apparent conflicts between the moral and the expedi-
ent (with an eye to showing them to be merely apparent),45 Cic-
ero posed two hypothetical situations involving insider trading.
Imagine an honest merchant who is bringing grain from Alex-
andria to Rhodes, where famine conditions prevail and he can
expect to sell his grain at a very favorable price. He knows that
TRACTS §§ 64349 (5th ed. 1874); G. VERPLANCK, AN ESSAY ON THE DOCTRINE OF CON-
TRACTS: BEING AN INQUIRY How CONTRACTS ARE AFFECTED IN LAW AND MORALS BY
CONCEALMENT, ERROR, OR INADEQUATE PRICE (1825); Goldfarb, Fraud and Nondisclosure
in the Vendor-Purchaser Relation, 8 CASE W. RES. LJ. 5 (1956); Keeton, Fraud-Concealment
and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1936); Levmore, supra note 16, at 13242.
41. See id. at 122, 159.
42. See Hays v. Meyers, 139 Ky. 440, 443, 107 S.W. 287, 288 (1908);J. KENT, supra
note 40, at § 485; Keeton, supra note 40, at 74-75; G. VERPLANCK, supra note 40, at 22-
23.
43. See Wilgus, supra note 17.
44. Cicero's argument and its subsequent criticisms were noted in passing by Barry,
supra note 16, at 1361 n.206.
45. See M. CICERO, DE OFFICns Bk. III (W. Miller trans. 1968), especially chapters
ii-iii, vii-vii, XiX-XXXiii.
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several other ships laden with grain are on their way to Rhodes;
if the Rhodians also learn of their imminent arrival, the de-
mand for the merchant's own grain will fall. "[I]s he to report
the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and
sell his own stock at the highest market price?"4 6 Cicero's sec-
ond example is the eternally recurring case of the vendor who
sells a building with a hidden defect.47 Consider an honest man
offering for sale a house with "certain undesirable features of
which he himself is aware but which nobody else knows,"48
such as vermin in the bedrooms or poor construction. "[I]f the
vendor does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him the
house for far more than he could reasonably have expected to
get for it, I ask whether his transaction is unjust or
dishonourable." 49
Cicero presented both sides of these questions through an
imaginary dialogue between the Stoic philosophers Diogenes
and Antipater; the latter argues for full disclosure, the former
defends the moral right to silence (though not to misrepresen-
tation). The argument concerning the Alexandrian grain
merchant remains unequalled today in its breadth and clarity.
"I have imported my stock," Diogenes' merchant will say;
"I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my
competitors-perhaps even lower, when the market is over-
stocked. Who is wronged?
"What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other
side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-
men and to serve society; you were brought into the world
under these conditions and have these inborn principles
which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your
interest shall be the interest of the community and con-
versely that the interest of the community shall be your in-
terest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from
your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at
hand for them?"
"It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply;
46. Id at Bk. III, ch. xii.
47. This problem arises in the law with enough frequency and in enough manifesta-
tions to fill a book. Indeed, an entire annotation has been devoted to cases involving
nondisclosure of termite infestations. See Annotation, Duty of Vendor of Real Estate to Give
Purchaser Information as to Termite Infestation, 22 A.L.R.3d 972 (1968). Roman law in Cic-
ero's time required the real estate vendor to disclose all known defects, but did not
require full disclosure by other vendors. See M. CICERO, supra note 45, at Bk. III, chs.
xvi-xvii.
48. See id at Bk. III, ch. xiii.
49. Id
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"not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present mo-
ment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not re-
vealing to you, the nature of the gods or the highest good;
and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to
you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am
under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to
your interest to be told."
"Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit,
if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged
by Nature and existing between man and man."
"I do not forget them," the other will reply; "but do you
mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that
there is no such thing as private property? If that is the case,
we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything
away."
50
The argument over disclosure of building defects takes much
the same form. Antipater castigates the seller who would allow
the buyer to purchase hastily without knowledge of the defects:
"[I]f this is not refusing 'to set a man right when he has lost
his way' (a crime which at Athens is prohibited on pain of
public execration), what is? It is even worse than refusing to
set a man on his way; it is deliberately leading a man
astray."51
Diogenes counters that the vendor in no way compels the
buyer to purchase. "He advertised for sale what he did not like;
you bought what you did like."52 As long as the purchaser can
exercise his own judgment, there can be neither fraud nor
breach of moral obligation. •
Cicero sided with Antipater: "I think, then, that it was the
duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back the facts from the
Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same
way with his purchaser." ' 3 Full disclosure is both moral and
expedient. It is moral for essentially the reasons given by
Antipater: "[T]here is a bond of fellowship ... which has the
very widest application, uniting all men together and each to
each."5 4 It is expedient because of the effect of nondisclosure
on one's honor. The person who fails to disclose what he
knows "would be no candid or sincere or straightforward or
upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty, sly, artful,
50. Id.
51. Id. at Bk. III, ch. xiii.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at Bk. III, ch. xvii.
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shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and sub-
tlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms
of reproach and many more besides?"55 In sum, concluded Cic-
ero, "it is not in accord with Nature that anyone should take
advantage of his neighbor's ignorance."5 "
Cicero's examples have inspired much comment. Between
the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, three of the major
continental writers in the natural law tradition-Aquinas, Gro-
tius, and Pufendorf-considered them and reached essentially
identical conclusions that differed in some respects from Cic-
ero's. They all found a duty to disclose facts pertaining to the
actual thing that is the subject of the contract, such as the de-
fects in a building,5 7 but no moral duty to disclose "circum-
stances which do not affect the thing itself; as if any one knows
that there are many ships on their way bringing corn."5' Gro-
tius noted that disclosure by the grain merchant would be
"kind and laudable; often so far, that it cannot be omitted with-
out violating the rule of charity," 59 and Aquinas agreed that for
the merchant to disclose or lower his price "would be exceed-
ingly virtuous on his part,"60 but both maintained that nondis-
closure would not violate principles ofjustice by leading to an
55. Id. at Bk. III, ch. xiii.
56. Id. at Bk. III, ch. xvii.
57. See, e.g., T. AquINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt.II-ii, q.77, art. 3 (Fathers of the Eng-
lish Dominican Province trans. 1947) (where a good's defects are not manifest, "judg-
ment of them is not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made known
to him"); 2 H. GRonus, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE ch. xii, § ix (W. Whewell trans.
1853) ("he who makes a contract about any thing, ought to make known the faults of
the thing so far as he knows them, which is not only the usual rule of Civil Laws, but
also agreeable to the nature of the act"); S. PUFENDORF, ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND
NATIONs Bk. V, ch. III, §§ ii-iii (B. Kennett trans. 1710) (full disclosure of defects is
necessary to the assignment of a just price). Aquinas allowed for nondisclosure of de-
fects as long as the goods would be useful to someone, even if not the buyer, and
"provided the seller take as much as he ought from the price." T. AQUINAS, .supra, at
pt. 11-ii, q. 77, art. 3. That is, as long as the price actually reflects the quality of the
goods, selling without disclosure of defects does not place on the buyer "an occasion of
danger or loss." Id. This suggests that the obligation of disclosure in these circum-
stances, the source of which is somewhat hazy, is based on the inability to arrive at the
"just price" when all extant information concerning the goods is not available to the
parties.
58. H. GRoTIus, supra note 57, at ch. xii, § ix. See T. AQUINAS, supra note 57, at pt. II-
ii, q. 77, art. 3 (the grain merchant "does not seem to act contrary to justice though not
stating what is going to happen," because there is no defect in the goods that makes
them less valuable than they seem at the time of sale); S. PUFENDORF, supra note 57, at
Bk. V, ch. III, § iv ("the Merchant, did not act unjustly, in saying nothing of the Ships,
that were coming. ForJustice only obliges us to expose, what immediately concerns the
Thing itself").
59. H. GROTIUS, supra note 57, at ch. xii, § ix.
60. T. AQUINAS, supra note 57, at pt. II-ii, q. 77, art. 3.
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unjust price. Pufendorf generally agreed with this assessment,
but went to somewhat greater lengths to defend the morality of
nondisclosure by the grain merchant. Morality, in his view,
"does not oblige me, to do another Man a Courtesy gratis, ex-
cept he be in extreme Want of it,"6 which was not the case
with the wealthy Rhodians, who may have lacked corn but had
no shortage of money. In addition, the loss to the merchant
would have been far greater than the gain to any individual
Rhodian, and one cannot expect men to endure that kind of
sacrifice. "For, provided the Love of Money does not tempt the
Merchants to cheat us, we may easily excuse them from what
the Law of Courtesy and Good-nature may seem to oblige them
tO.$"62
Pothier, in his 1806 treatise on the law of sales,6 3 agreed that
there is a duty, in morals if not in law, to disclose defects per-
taining to the thing which the contract concerns," and that no
enforceable legal duty of disclosure should be imposed on the
grain merchant, 65 but only partially accepted the conclusion
that the grain merchant satisfies his moral obligations by not
misrepresenting the facts. While conceding that Cicero's full-
disclosure position "is somewhat difficult to maintain even in
the forum of conscience,"6 6 Pothier also found "some diffi-
culty, in the forum of conscience, in excusing the injustice of a
profit"67 under the particular circumstances of Cicero's exam-
ple. By keeping his peace about matters that are sure to lead to a
very dramatic reduction in the value of the grain in the immedi-
ate future, the merchant seeks to obtain from the Rhodians
more than the equivalent of what he gives.
Kent was appalled by the moral laxity of his Christian prede-
cessors. As a matter of law, he agreed with the prior writers that
61. S. PUFENDORF, supra note 57, at Bk. V, ch. III, § iv.
62. Id
63. R. POTHIER, TRAr DU CONTRAT DE VENTE (1806).
64. Id at §§ 233-39 (quoted in Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 185-87 n.c
(1817)). Pothier specifically took issue with Aquinas' view that nondisclosure is proper
as long as the seller does not use the absence of disclosure to obtain a higher price for
the article than he would otherwise receive, see note 57, supra, calling this position "un-
just, since, as the vendor is perfectly at liberty to sell or not to sell, he ought to leave
the vendee perfectly at liberty to buy or not to buy, even for a fair price, if that price
does not suit the buyer .... "Id at § 237 (quoted in Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 187
nc).
65. See id at § 241 (quoted in Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.), at 188 n.c).
66. Id
67. Id (quoted in Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.), at 189 n.c).
No. 3]
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
Cicero's high moral rules are "of too severe and elevated a
character for practical application, or the cognizance of human
tribunals,"68 but in the forum of conscience he found it "a little
singular . . . that some of the best ethical writers under the
Christian dispensation, should complain of the moral lessons
of Cicero, as being too austere in their texture, and too sublime
in speculation, for actual use."6 9
A very different view was taken by Verplanck in an 1825 trea-
tise. Contrary to what he (unlike Kent) saw as the intimations of
the civil law writers, Verplanck denied "that either party is
bound in conscience, or even by a delicate and fastidious honour, to
communicate to the other.. every circumstance regarding the
business, which the buyer has an interest in knowing." 70 Exam-
ples can be multiplied of cases in which persons acquire supe-
rior knowledge through skill or industry; for example, a person
who invents a new, cheaper method of working marble thereby
acquires knowledge of a probable future increase in the value
of the raw material. These advantages "are the necessary and
lawful stimulants of that activity which, in the search after pri-
vate profit, opens a thousand springs of prosperity and plenty
for the use of all; and within just limits, are as free from moral
guilt as they are fruitful of public utility."' T
These examples by no means exhaust the consideration
given by older writers to the ethics of absolute informational
equality, 72 nor do they fully disclose the possibly varying moral
68. J. KENT, supra note 40, at § 491 (footnote omitted).
69. Id.
70. G. VERPLANCK, supra note 40, at 75 (emphasis added).
71. Id at 79. According to Verplanck, the "just limits" are reached when there is a
common understanding that no advantage will be taken even of superior skill. See id. at
127. Williston's position on nondisclosure is virtually identical. See 12 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1498, at 385-86 (3d ed. 1970).
72. Rutherforth insisted that the Alexandrian merchant had a duty to disclose his
information because in the absence of disclosure one could not discover the just price.
See T. RUTHERFORTH, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW 113-14 (2d ed. 1832). Paley is some-
times regarded as a proponent of absolute informational equality, see G. BOWER, supra
note 40, at 595 & n.u; J. STORY, supra note 40, at § 205 n.l (3d ed. 1842), but the
passage cited in support of this position speaks only to the designed concealment of
defects in the thing being sold. See W. PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY Bk. III, pt.1, ch. vii (10th ed. 1821). Some writers were content to observe
that ethics is broader than law, seeJ. STORY, supra note 40, at §§ 204-05; W. STORY, Supra
note 40, at § 644, and that Anglo-American courts do not require full disclosure
"[h]owever correct Cicero's view may be of the duty of every man, in point of morals,
to disclose all facts to another, with whom he is dealing, which are material to his inter-
est... "J. STORY, supra note 40, at § 205. See also Goldfarb, supra note 40, at 41 (hinting
that all nondisclosure might be immoral).
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premises underlying these discussions, 73 but they hopefully
demonstrate that the broad egalitarian conception of fairness
advanced by Professor Levmore, while fully accepted by only a
few moralists, requires more serious consideration than Profes-
sor Manne or Judge Easterbrook are prepared to give. It is a
doctrine of great power and long standing, and accordingly
may have an influence well beyond the extent of its formal
acceptance.
B. Informational Equality and Unselfishness
Advocates of full disclosure, past and present, have advanced
essentially a single argument in support of their position: It is
every person's duty to serve his fellow men and to place their
interests, if not above his own, then at least on the same level.
Professor Levmore, the modern champion of informational
equality, endorses the weaker formulation of this argument,
grounding a general moral obligation of disclosure on "the
'golden rule' of interpersonal behavior-treating others as we
would ourselves."74 This rule is perhaps more felicitously
phrased as "treating others' interests as we would our own,"
which avoids the embarrassment to the golden rule posed by
masochists and risk-preferrers.
Once the imperative is framed as treating the interests of
others equally with our own, Professor Levmore's charge that
insider trading is unfair becomes clear. By disclosing all that we
know to the other party, we better allow him to assess the trans-
action from the standpoint of his own interests. Although we
may benefit from nondisclosure, he will benefit from disclosure
(assuming that the benefits of having the information made
available exceed the costs of evaluating it). To use superior in-
formation thus places our own advantage above that of the per-
son with whom we are trading. However, this formulation of
the principle-treating our own interests equally with those of
others-is of no use for analyzing insider trading. If A pos-
sesses information that B would like to have, A has two choices:
disclose or not disclose. Unless A can prefer the welfare of
73. See Schneewind, Pufendorf's Place in the History of Ethics, 72 SYNTHESE 123 (1987)
(comparing and contrasting Pufendorf's moral theory with that of Grotius and, to a
lesser extent, Aquinas).
74. Levmore, supra note 16, at 122-23. Kent did not explain his position, but his
invocation of Christian ethics on behalf of Cicero indicates that he probably took the
same view.
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either himself or B, he has no means (absent some substantive
moral principle independent of the golden rule) for determin-
ing whether to disclose or not disclose. If he prefers his own
welfare to B's, he will not disclose (again absent some in-
dependent substantive reason supporting disclosure). If he
prefers B's welfare to his own, he will disclose and absorb the
cost of the foregone opportunity. If he is indifferent between
his own welfare and B's, then by definition he has no basis for
preferring disclosure to nondisclosure. The golden rule as ex-
pressed by Professor Levmore serves at most as a formal side-
constraint on other moral principles; by itself, it says nothing
about insider trading.
In order to generate a rule of decision, Professor Levmore's
golden rule must be joined to a theory that allows human inter-
ests to be ranked or aggregated in some fashion: If A's interest
in the information ranks higher than B's, he should not dis-
close; if the reverse is true, he should; and if C's interest out-
ranks them all, perhaps A should disclose to C, who would then
suppress the information from B. The golden rule in such a
case is construed only to require that A not rank his own inter-
ests above B's merely because they are his own. Neither Profes-
sor Levmore nor any other proponent of informational equality
has proposed such a theory. Nor can one be inferred from their
views, as the range of theories that can be put to this task of
interest-ordering is endless.75 However, while different theo-
ries of interest-ordering will surely single out different classes
of transactions for moral disapproval, it is inconceivable that
any plausible theory would lead to the conclusion that insider
75. Classical utilitarianism, for instance, is an interest-ordering theory that complies
with the golden rule by prescribing that one's own utility count in the utilitarian
calculus no more and no less than anyone else's. See J. MILL, UTILITARIANISM 22 (0.
Piest. ed. 1957) ("In the golden rule ofJesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit
of the ethics of utility. 'To do as you would be done by,' and 'to love your neighbor as
yourself,' constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality."). More recently, R.M.
Hare has used golden rule considerations as a key element in a sophisticated argument
for a form of utilitarianism, see R. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND
PoiNr (1981); Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 23,
26-29 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982), and there is a noted tendency for the golden
rule to lead to utilitarianism when applied to multilateral cases. See R. HARE, supra, at
108-11; Pollock, Formal Moral Arguments, 53 PERSONALIST 25, 39 (1972); Robins, Two
Precepts of Morality, 54 PERSONALIST 340, 346-47 (1973). However, other ordering prin-
ciples are surely possible. For example, one could say that insider trading is morally
permissible only when it serves the interests of the neediest, wisest, or strongest indi-
vidual affected by the transaction. Presumably, any such principle would be consistent
with the golden rule as long as one evaluates one's own need, wisdom, or strength by
the same standards as that of others.
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trading is always wrong-can it be that the interests of the per-
son with whom one is trading will always turn out to be para-
mount? Hence, if a moral obligation of disclosure in all
circumstances is thought to follow from the principle that we
should love our fellow man, it must come from an ethic that
adopts the stronger version of the golden rule and commands
us not merely to love our neighbors as ourselves, but to place
the interests of our neighbors above our own-to be, in other
words, not merely unselfish, but antiselfish, or altruistic.
It is not clear, however, that even the strong form of this
principle establishes that all insider trading is immoral. That
principle determines only the proper relationship between one-
self and the rest of the world; it does not tell us how the rest of
the world should be ordered, and thus provides no guidance in
multilateral cases. For example, one can strictly comply with
the golden rule of preferring others' interests to one's own by
using superior information to benefit third parties. It is no an-
swer to say that such judgments of the relative worth of others'
interests are simply impermissible because disrespectful of the
equal autonomy of all persons. In addition to being inconsis-
tent with the inferior ranking of one's own interests, that man-
date would make obvious the golden rule's uselessness as a
moral guide-it is impossible simultaneously to serve all of the
relevant interests of four billion different people.7 6 Again,
then, in order to know whether insider trading is permitted or
forbidden by the golden rule, it is necessary to have a substan-
tive moral theory that goes beyond the rule's essentially formal
constraints and tells us when it is permissible to allow the inter-
ests of some persons to take priority over the interests of
others. And again, it is unlikely that any such theory will con-
demn all insider trading.
The same difficulties confront Antipater's suggestion that in-
sider trading is always immoral because people have an obliga-
76. The point is recognized by Professor Kennedy, a modem altruist. See Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1685, 1718 (1976)
("[T]he altruist is unwilling to carry his premise of solidarity to the extreme of making
everyone responsible for the welfare of everyone else."). Professor Kennedy offers pos-
sible criteria for identifying those instances in which a duty to serve arises, but states no
justification for those criteria. See id. The utilitarian solves the problem either by aggre-
gating interests in some macroconsequentialist fashion, as in the traditional formula-
tion, or by prescribing that the actor should imagine himself simultaneously possessing
the (prudent) preferences of all relevant persons, which he can then choose among
without giving extra weight to his own. See Hare, supra note 75, at 26.
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tion to serve society. That sounds imposing, but what does it
mean? Society consists of individuals. Serving society thus
means serving some set of individuals, which raises anew the
question of which individuals one is to serve. Moreover, if serv-
ing society consists of maximizing wealth or pleasure-popular
conceptions in no way excluded by Antipater's statement of the
principle-it is far from obvious that at least some forms of in-
sider trading, and perhaps even the forms specifically con-
demned by Antipater, do not achieve this end. In other words,
in order to give this view content, one needs a substantive con-
ception of what constitutes service to society. It will then be an
empirical question whether that conception is well- or ill-
served by insider trading, either generally or in specific forms.
A conclusion that insider trading never serves society seems
improbable.
At this point, even an altruist who does not have a substan-
tive principle of interest-ordering may well object that this is all
too easy, and more than a little unfair. Following the golden
rule involves "treating others' interests as we would (or superior
to) our own." That is, it focuses not merely on the conse-
quences of action-whether the interests of others were ad-
vanced as much or more than our own-but also on the
intention to benefit others. Indeed, for many people intentions
play a major role in moral theory, and for some they explicitly
play a decisive role.7 Thus, if the golden rule is to be used as a
basis for condemning all insider trading as immoral, it must be
reformulated once again: It is not enough that a person act in
such a way as to advance the interests of others (however
"others" and "interests" are understood); he is required in ad-
dition, or perhaps instead, to intend to benefit others. But once
more, if all that is necessary is an intention to benefit someone
else, the objection is not to insider trading as such but to in-
sider trading for personal advantage. The new golden rule is
satisfied as long as one intends by trading on superior informa-
tion to benefit third parties, or perhaps even the other party by
dramatically showing him the consequences of laxity and inade-
quate investment in the production of information.
77. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 61 (H. Paton trans.
1964) ("It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which
can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will") (emphasis added).
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C. An Egoistic Interlude
Unless tied to a substantive principle of interest-ordering,
the altruistic formulation of the golden rule does not determine
which transactions are morally good. But when given an inten-
tionalist interpretation it does single out a clearly identifiable
class of transactions as immoral: those undertaken for personal
gain. While that is not the position desired by informational
egalitarians, it is a result of no small moment. Few would advo-
cate enacting such a rule into the statute books, but its appeal
as a moral ideal is widespread." Accordingly, the substance of
this ethical position should be addressed more directly than I
have done thus far. In principle, the substantive issue can be
joined either by criticizing the affirmative case advanced in
favor of altruism or by setting forth an alternative. In practice,
only the latter option is available. Altruism tends to be de-
fended-when it is in fact defended rather than taken for
granted-essentially on the ground that its alternatives are un-
acceptable, or even unthinkable.79 This means that the best,
and indeed the only feasible, rebuttal to Antipater, Cicero,
Kent, and Professor Levmore is to suggest an acceptable alter-
native. Accordingly, I suggest one here, though without even a
cursory attempt at justification-a task well beyond the scope
of this article and my present means. Nonetheless, advancing a
positive theory, even if only by assertion, provides a useful ref-
erence point for further discussion. It is also a necessary coun-
terpoint to those such as Professor Dworkin who serenely
declare that a person's conduct "of course ... has no inherent
moral value if he acts with the intention of benefiting only
78. For centuries, a long string of philosophers has forcefully asserted that personal
benefit is the very antithesis of morality. See From the Special "Horror File, " OBJEcriVIsT,
Aug. 1971, at 12-16 (collecting fifteen centuries of such views). In principle, self-inter-
ested conduct can be viewed simply as non-moral or as affirmatively immoral, though
in practice the two views converge. If moral weight is given to the effect of one's action
on others (which will surely be the case with any theory that opposes morality and self-
interest), some other person complains that your conduct has damaged him, and your
only reason for acting is self-interest, then even if self-interested conduct is non-moral,
the moral detriment of your action is offset by no positive moral consideration.
79. This is a large statement, particularly for someone who is not a philosopher.
Nonetheless, I stand by it. At some level, the paucity of affirmative arguments for altru-
ism is inevitable, as it is difficult to imagine how one could ever convince someone not
already persuaded that he should act in disregard of his own interests because they are
his own. See Dwyer, Criticisms of Egoism, 56 PERSONALIST 214, 227 (1975) ("the prospect
of a legitimate argument for the 'virtue' of self-sacrifice is about as unlikely as the dis-
covery of a contradiction somewhere in the universe").
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himself."8 0
As the argument of Antipater demonstrates, the notion that
the individual's highest moral calling and obligation is service
to others is ancient, pre-dating Christianity. But the opposite
view-that the individual's highest moral calling and obligation
is service to himself-has equally ancient roots in the classical
Greek tradition of eudaimonism, a term with no generally recog-
nized English equivalent, but which is often translated as "the
view that the end of life consists in happiness, conceived of as
an all-round, balanced, long-range type of well being, in dis-
tinction from pleasure." 8 I A modem eudaimonist defines the
root term, eudaimonia, as "the condition of living in harmony
with one's daimon or innate potentiality, 'living in truth to one-
self.' It is marked by a distinctive feeling that constitutes its in-
trinsic reward and therefore bears the same name as the
condition itself."81 2 A eudaimonistic ethic holds that each per-
son ought to live in accordance with his human nature, part of
which is common to all persons (that which makes him human)
and part of which is unique to him as an individual.8 3 His moral
task is to identify that human excellence that is distinctively his
own-that is, his daimon 84 -and the principles of conduct that
will allow him to develop that excellence and flourish as a per-
son. Modem advocates of eudaimonism often refer to it as
classical egoism 8 -egoism because the ultimate justification
for conduct is (contra Professor Dworkin) the advancement of
the self's rightly understood interests, and classical because the
underlying conception of selfhood is grounded in Greek essen-
tialism. Another descriptive term is rational egoism, which re-
flects both the objective character of the moral enterprise (an
individual can be profoundly mistaken as to what aspects of his
nature he ought to actualize and how best to actualize them)
80. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 211-12 (1979) (emphasis in
original). See also I. KAr, supra note 77, at 61-68 (only actions performed from a motive
of duty rather than from inclination or self-interest have moral worth).
81. See I W.JONES, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 369 (2d ed. 1970).
82. D. NORTON, PERSONAL DESTINIES: A PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICAL INDIVIDUALISM 216
(1976).
83. See generally id. at 3-41.
84. See id. at 14.
85. See Den Uyl & Rasmussen, Life, Teleology, and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Ayn Rand,
in THE PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT OF AYN RAND 63, 77 (D. Den Uyl & D. Rasmussen eds.
1984); Machan, Recent Work in Ethical Egoism, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 1 (1979) [hereinafter
Ethical Egoism]; see generally Machan, The Classical Egoist Basis of Capitalism, in THE MAIN
DEBATE: COMMUNISM VERSUS CAPITALISM 139 (T. Machan ed. 1987).
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and the crucial role of reason, man's defining attribute, as an
essential constituent of every individual's distinctive excellence
or daimon.
Although eudaimonism provides the interest-ordering prin-
ciple lacking in the versions of the golden rule criticized earlier,
one cannot in the abstract specify a precise content for a
eudaimonistic ethic, because each person has unique potential-
ities that, in the particular circumstances in which he finds him-
self, ought to be actualized if he is to flourish as a person. But
the compactly-stated principle that each individual ought to use
his reason to seek " 'self-fulfillment within the range of avail-
able possibilities' "6 provides a means for assessing the propri-
ety of conduct for any given set of concrete circumstances.
Moreover, the principle is true for all persons, because it is
grounded in the nature of man.
As is true of any moral theory, to defend rather than describe
eudaimonism would obviously require addressing an enormous
range of issues: What does it mean, either epistemologically or
metaphysically, to say that man has a nature? And so what if he
does? Is this not the naturalistic fallacy in action? As a variant
of egoism, is eudaimonism even coherent as a moral theory?
Does it not ignore the social character of man's development?
And what about [the reader may fill in the blank] as a better
alternative? These and others are good questions, to which
eudaimonistic moral philosophers have sought to give good an-
swers.87 It is enough for the limited purpose of taking issue
with Antipater et al. to emphasize that eudaimonism differs ma-
terially from both hedonism and psychological egoism. The
principal modem criticisms of egoism-that it is incoherent as
a moral theory"8 or leads to unacceptable social conse-
86. Machan, supra note 85, at 151.
87. See D. NORTON, supra note 82; A. RAND, THE VIRTUE OF SELFISHNESS: A NEW
CONCEPT OF EGOIsM (1964); Den Uyl & Rasmussen, supra note 85; Den Uyl & Rasmus-
sen, Nozick on the Randian Argument, 59 PERSONALIST 184 (1978); Machan, The Classical
Egoist Basis of Capitalism, supra note 85; Ethical Egoism, supra note 85; Mack, How to Derive
Ethical Egoism, 52 PERSONALIST 735 (1971); Mack, Egoism and Rights, 54 PERSONALIST 5
(1973) [hereinafter Egoism and Rights]; Rasmussen, Essentialism, Values and Rights: The
Objectivist Case for the Free Society, in THE LIBERTARIAN READER 37 (T. Machan ed. 1982).
An epistemological foundation for the eudaimonistic theory of human nature is found
in A. RAND, INTRODUCTION TO OBJECTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY (1979). Norton, alone
among these authors, does not draw on Rand's work.
88. SeeJ. RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 131-36 (1971); Ethical Egoism, supra note 85,
at 2-3, 6-7, 10. It is often said that egoism fails to provide a guide to conduct, "for if
everyone is authorized to advance his aims as he pleases, or if everyone ought to ad-
vance his own interests, competing claims are not ranked at all and the outcome is
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quences8 -are aimed at species of egoism that tell the individ-
ual "to advance his aims as he pleases."90 Even if those
criticisms are valid in that context, they do not so readily dis-
pose of egoistic theories in the classical mode. Eudaimonism,
for example, instructs the individual to seek to develop social
relations and institutions that take advantage of the numerous
opportunities for individual flourishing available only in soci-
ety, including those means of flourishing generally viewed as
non-economic, while minimizing the risks to personal develop-
ment posed by the proximity of other active moral agents, who
share the human faculty of reason and have their own moral
tasks to perform. It is of course a long leap from this prescrip-
tion to particular conclusions about the way people ought to
treat each other. The point is merely that to brush off egoism as
necessarily "antisocial, callous, anticommunitarian"91 reflects a
very narrow conception of a person's interests that is alien to
the classical egoist tradition. The charges may prove to be true,
but proof is necessary. Similarly, because eudaimonism con-
ceives of the self's interests objectively rather than subjectively
(it is not true that a person ought to pursue whatever he hap-
pens to want at the time), it is at least not as obvious as some
critics have assumed that egoism is necessarily non-universaliz-
able and must fail to guide conduct in a social setting. 92
The point of this excursion into egoistic moral theory should
not be misunderstood. The unfortunate fact is that once the
question of who is to be the beneficiary of moral conduct is
broached, there are a finite number of options-yourself, your-
determined by force and cunning." J. RAWLS, supra, at 136. See also K. BAIER, THE
MORAL POINT OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHIcs 189-90 (1958) (if B and K are
egoists seeking the same elective office, for K to prevent B from eliminating him would
be both right, because consistent with K's duty to promote his interests, and wrong,
because inconsistent with B's performance of his duty).
89. See Ethical Egoism, supra note 85, at 12-13. The argument from unacceptability
generally takes the form (in varying degrees of sophistication) of something like: " 'Oh,
so you believe that an individual may do anything he pleases, without regard for the
rights of others-he may exploit, brutalize, rape, murder, if he so chooses-with no
obligation to consider anything but his own desires.' " Branden, Rational Egoism-Con-
tinued, 51 PERSONALIST 305, 305 (1970). For examples of arguments by academics that
do not differ greatly from this caricature, see Ethical Egoism, supra note 85, at 5, 9.
90. J. RAwLS, supra note 88, at 136.
91. Machan, supra note 85, at 143. See generally D. NORTON, supra note 82, at 275-309.
92. One must also guard against defining universalizability in ways that beg the
question against egoism. On egoistic premises, "value" is a relational concept. Some-
thing can only be valued by or valuable to someone. Accordingly, one cannot convict
egoism ofincoherence by invoking examples that assume the absolute or intrinsic value
of some good or action. See Egoism and Rights, supra note 87, at 10-11.
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self equally with others, others, and no one-from which one
must choose. The widest, most sweeping moral arguments his-
torically advanced against insider trading choose either the sec-
ond option (which typically leads to macroconsequentialism) or
the third. I mean only to remind the reader that the relevant
choice set also includes the first.
D. Eudaimonism and Insider Trading
If it seems fanciful to inquire whether an egoistic or
eudaimonistic ethic would condemn all, or even most, in-
stances of trading on superior information, consider that Cic-
ero, unlike his foil Antipater, justified his universal opposition
to nondisclosure at least partially on grounds that can readily
be cast in egoistic terms. Cicero's mission was to show that
there is no true conflict between the moral and the expedient.
By taking advantage of superior information, he argued, one
opens oneself up to charges of slyness, dishonesty, etc. "Is it
not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of re-
proach and many more besides?"9 Is it not, in other words,
contrary to one's rational self-interest to incur the disapproval
of your fellows by engaging in practices they will deem
unsavory?
Granting the factual premise that disapproval will follow, the
eudaimonistic answer, at least, is no. If the disapproval comes
from fellows whose judgment one respects, then it is a serious
matter that might well prompt reconsideration. But social dis-
approval, even from those whom one values, is not itself suffi-
cient reason for action or inaction. Central to the eudaimonistic
ethic is the virtue of integrity. The term has a broader meaning
than it does in ordinary discourse; it' means, in effect, living
truly to one's nature.94 "To thine own self be true," in other
words, is something that eudaimonists take literally. The opin-
ions of others are not irrelevant-they might be right and we
wrong as to what is self-fulfilling conduct, and maintaining rela-
tions with them is affirmatively good-but the touchstone must
be our own development as individuals, and final responsibility
for our choices is non-delegable. Disclosure of superior infor-
mation may well be the right answer for a given individual in a
given case-if, for example, he has promised to disclose, or
93. M. CICERO, supra note 45, at Bk. III, ch. xiii.
94. See D. NORTON, supra note 82, at 8-20.
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failing to disclose would seriously damage someone of great
importance to him-but it is not the right answer simply be-
cause the opinions of others say so. Specifying when disclosure
is proper is impossible, because the character of the
eudaimonistic principle precludes making such particularized
judgments without knowing the identity of the individual in
question and his concrete circumstances. One can say, how-
ever, that nondisclosure is not necessarily wrong simply be-
cause it will lead to individual profit. We are physical beings in
a material world, and wealth is a good thing vital to our flour-
ishing (even though we are capable of using it unwisely). All
else being equal, and even some other things being unequal, it
is morally right to obtain more of it rather than less. It remains
to ask whether particular means for obtaining wealth are mor-
ally appropriate, but the fact of profit is a moral plus, not a
minus.
II. THE EQUAL ACCESS RATIONALE
If insider trading is not immoral merely by virtue of being
insider trading or self-interested, then the next step is to try to
identify particular classes of morally objectionable transactions.
One prominent candidate is the class of transactions in which
the parties are not merely unequal in their possession of informa-
tion, but also in their access to that information. This has been a
very popular moral position specifically with respect to insider
stock trading. Elements of it can be found in the congressional
reports accompanying the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act 95 ;
it was the explicit rationale for the court decision that initiated
the modem era of insider stock trading regulation9 6; and at
least two Supreme CourtJustices have endorsed it.97 It has also
received substantial academic support. Professor Brudney, per-
haps the foremost advocate of this approach, seeks to focus at-
tention on transactions utilizing "unerodable informational
95. See supra note 18.
96. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (a rule against insider trading can be grounded "on the justifiable
expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal ex-
changes have relatively equal access to material information"). See also id. at 852; Scott,
supra note 16, at 806 ("The 'equal access to information' view of fairness became the
dominant approach, although some other conceptions were still alluded to from time
to time in the cases").
97. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 247 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Marshall, J.).
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advantages that one trader has over another" 9 -that is, infor-
mational asymmetries that cannot be overcome by any amount
of skill or resources because it would violate legal or corporate
restrictions to disclose the information to public investors.99
Professor Brudney finds in this unerodability the source of the
widespread intuitions of the unfairness of insider stock trad-
ing.100 This perceived unfairness lies not merely in the infor-
mational advantage, which might be possessed by a clever or
diligent outsider and is not by itself morally troublesome, but
in "the fact that it is an advantage which cannot be competed
away since it depends upon a lawful privilege to which an out-
sider cannot acquire access." 10' Professor Aldave similarly as-
cribes intuitions of unfairness to equal access concerns.' 02
Like the full disclosure theory, the equal access view has an
impressive historical pedigree in the wider context of contract
law. The moral issue was framed, though not answered, in
Laidlaw v. Organ,10 3 perhaps the most famous insider trading
case (in the economic sense) to reach the Supreme Court. Dur-
ing the War of 1812, New Orleans was subjected to a naval
blockade. News of the war's end was brought to the city from
the British fleet on the night of February 18, 1815, by three
men, one of whom made it public the following morning.
Shortly before that public release, one Mr. Organ learned the
news from his partner, the brother of one of the three men. Mr.
Organ then purchased from Laidlaw & Co. a substantial quan-
tity of tobacco, which he rightly expected to increase in value
when it became known that the naval blockade was ended.
Before the deal was struck, one of Laidlaw's agents asked Mr.
Organ "if there was any news which was calculated to enhance
the price or value of the article about to be purchased."' 4 Mr.
Organ evidently gave no reply.'0 5 When news of the peace
treaty became public, and the price of New Orleans tobacco
duly rose, Laidlaw refused to deliver the goods. Mr. Organ
98. Brudney, supra note 16, at 376.
99. See id. at 354-55.
100. Id at 346 ("The inability of a public investor with whom an insider transacts on
inside information ever lawfully to erode the insider's informational advantage gener-
ates a sense of unfairness").
101. Id
102. See Aldave, supra note 16, at 123.
103. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
104. Id at 183.
105. Id at 188-89, 193, 194.
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sued to compel delivery, and the trial court instructed the jury
to find in his favor.
Laidlaw appealed to the Supreme Court, and succeeded in
obtaining a new trial. The Court, in an opinion by ChiefJustice
Marshall, held that each party to a contract "must take care not
to say or do any thing tending to impose upon the other,"'' 0 6
and that the jury must be allowed to decide whether Organ had
"impose[d]" on Laidlaw. Although the case thus holds that
mere nondisclosure can constitute fraud under the proper cir-
cumstances, it is best known for its dictum. In addition to argu-
ing that Mr. Organ's silence in the face of Laidlaw's pointed
inquiry about tobacco values was fraudulent, Laidlaw's counsel
urged upon the Court the broader rule that any "[s]uppression
of material circumstances within the knowledge of the vendee,
and not accessible to the vendor, is equivalent to fraud, and vitiates
the contract,"'' 7 citing as authority Pothier's discourse on the
law and morals of nondisclosure.'0 8 Mr. Organ's counsel as-
sumed arguendo that his client's conduct was immoral, but de-
fended his legal right to withhold his information. "Human
laws are imperfect in this respect," was the argument, "and the
sphere of morality is more extensive than the limits of civil ju-
risdiction. The maxim of caveat emptor could never have crept
into the law, if the province of ethics had been co-extensive
with it."' 09 Mr. Organ practiced no legal deceit upon Laidlaw
"unless rising earlier in the morning, and obtaining by superior
diligence and alertness that intelligence by which the price of
commodities was regulated, be such."' 10
Chief Justice Marshall declared that "[t]he question""'
presented by the case was "whether the intelligence of extrinsic
circumstances, which might influence the price of the commod-
ity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the ven-
dee, ought to have been communicated by him to the
vendor."112 He answered it in favor of Mr. Organ, in a one sen-
tence discussion: "It would be difficult to circumscribe the con-
trary doctrine [the one urged by Laidlaw] within proper limits,
106. Id at 195.
107. See id. at 184-85 (emphasis added).
108. See text accompanying notes 63-67.
109. Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 184-85.
110. Id at 193.
111. Id. at 195. This characterization was patently false, as the case's actual holding
conclusively proves.
112. Id. at 195.
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where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties."' "1 3
While Chief Justice Marshall and Laidlaw's counsel thus dis-
agreed as to whether or not Mr. Organ's information regarding
the end of the War of 1812 was "accessible" to Laidlaw (a disa-
greement discussed below), they both considered the question
of accessibility to be relevant. Kent did as well, stating as a legal
maxim that suppression of material facts "in cases in which
both parties have not equal access to the means of information
... will be deemed unfair dealing, and will vitiate and avoid the
contract."1 4 He immediately took it back in a footnote, declar-
ing that the rule, "though one undoubtedly of moral obliga-
tion, "115 is "perhaps too broadly stated, to be sustained by the
practical doctrines of the courts.""' 6 Nonetheless, enough
courts have stated the principle as positive law in either holding
or dicta' 17 to enable a legal encyclopedia to express it as black-
letter law.'1 ' While it is possible to offer an economic explana-
tion for these cases, 19 it is also possible that they were driven,
at least in part, by something akin to Professor Brudney's view
of fairness. Hence, the equal access theory is a prime contender
for a moral position from which to condemn at least some
forms of insider trading.
But what is meant by "access"? The importance of this ques-
tion is illustrated by the evident disagreement between Chief
Justice Marshall and Laidlaw's counsel over whether Mr. Or-
gan's inside information was equally accessible to Laidlaw. It
surely was accessible in the sense that Laidlaw's failure to ob-
tain it was not due to any threat of legal sanctions. It was not
113. Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
114. J. KENT, supra note 40, at § 482. See also id. ("As a general rule, each party is
bound to communicate to the other, his knowledge of material facts, provided he
knows the other to be ignorant of them, and they be not open and naked, or equally
within the reach of his observation.").
115. Id.
116. Id. at § 482 n.a. The qualifying footnote limited the rule to cases in which the
parties are in some special relationship, "by confidence reposed, or otherwise." Id.
117. See Camp v. Camp, 2 Ala. 632, 635-36 (1841) (citing Kent); Gutelius v.
Sisemore, 365 P.2d 732, 735 (Okla. 1961) (dictum); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 56 Wash.
449, 452-53, 353 P.2d 672, 674-75 (1960).
118. See 37 AM.JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 148 (1968) ("There is abundant authority
to the effect that if one party to a contract or transaction has superior knowledge, or
knowledge which is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party and
which he could not discover by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or means of knowl-
edge which are not open to both parties alike, he is under a legal obligation to speak")
(footnotes omitted). The abundant authorities cited for this proposition do not all sup-
port it, but the claim is not unfounded. See Brudney, supra note 16, at 355 n.110.
119. See Kronman, supra note 40, at 23.
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accessible in the sense that Laidlaw had no inside contacts who
were prepared to reveal the information prior to its public re-
lease and no other obvious means of discovering it. Professor
Brudney, recognizing the importance of defining access prop-
erly,1 20 adopts the former approach. In his view, informational
advantages should be unusable when those who do not possess
the relevant information cannot obtain it lawfully, "no matter
how great may be their diligence or large their resources."' 2'
His proposed legal rule (which appears also to be his moral
rule) would
deny an informational advantage to those who seek to use
otherwise nonpublic information which they are precluded
by legal restrictions from disclosing to public investors. And
it may appropriately extend to those who, while not pre-
cluded by law from waiving their informational advantage,
derive it from sources who will not make it public, so that the
public cannot lawfully obtain it. 12 2
Thus, if a corporate insider learns information that the corpo-
ration, for its own business reasons, does not want to disclose
to the public, and that is therefore not lawfully available to non-
insiders, it would be unfair for him to trade on that
information.
Judge Easterbrook has answered this argument by claiming
that a distinction between lawful and unlawful access necessar-
ily breaks down because access is always a matter of costs:
People do not have or lack "access" in some absolute sense.
There are, instead, different costs of obtaining information.
An outsider's costs are high; he might have to purchase the
information from the firm. Managers have lower costs (the
amount of salary foregone); brokers have relatively low costs
(the value of the time they spent investigating); Sherlock
Holmes also may be able to infer extraordinary facts from
ordinary occurrences at low cost. The different costs of ac-
cess are simply a function of the division of labor. A manager
(or a physician) always knows more than a shareholder (or
patient) in some respects, but unless there is something un-
ethical about the division of labor, the difference is not
unfair. 123
120. See Brudney, supra note 16, at 354-55.
121. Id. at 354.
122. IME at 355 (footnote omitted).
123. Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 330.
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This analysis has been widely followed, 124 and with good rea-
son. Legal barriers do not hermetically seal off information;
they only restrict the methods that can be used to obtain it. If
information is not public because the corporation exercises a
legal right to withhold it, the outsider is not legally forbidden
from acquiring the information; he is merely forbidden from
acquiring it by any methods other than buying it from the cor-
poration or becoming an insider. Neither course may be very
practical or attractive, but that is surely true of the overcoming
of many nonlegal barriers as well. If Mr. Organ gleaned his
knowledge of a prospective increase in tobacco prices from
subtle signals that only a twenty-year veteran of the tobacco
markets would recognize, that information is, in every real
sense, unavailable to me unless I purchase it from him or some-
one equally skilled. The price of acquiring that information on
my own is twenty years, and even if I am willing to pay it, it will
not help me this time around. An equal access theory must ex-
plain why inequality in some means of access to information is
morally significant while other inequalities are not. Conceiva-
bly, one could attach special significance to those methods of
obtaining information that involve the exercise of skill and dili-
gence, but it is not clear why this focus would lead to an "equal
access" approach rather than to a more general theory of prop-
erty rights in information. Furthermore, unless one can argue
that it requires no skill or diligence to become a corporate in-
sider or to acquire enough funds to purchase information, the
distinction is especially unpromising in the context of insider
stock trading. Other distinctions can be drawn based on the
perceived costs of certain access barriers, which prevent all but
a select few who have the necessary wealth, talent, or a well-
placed brother-in-law from obtaining the information, but that
is less an indictment of the lack of access than it is of the distri-
bution of wealth, talent, and brothers-in-law. That is, unless the
real force motivating an unequal access objection is concern
about wealth distribution, there does not appear to be any
plausible principle that can distinguish good access barriers
from bad ones.
One could, of course, condemn all inequality of access,
whether legal or economic. However, the moral difference be-
124. See Solinga, supra note 16, at 105-06; Note, supra note 16, at 848-49.
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tween this position and one requiring equality of position is not
evident. And if it is unfair always to take advantage of superior
access to information, one must ask why. The only answer that
comes to mind is that one should not take advantage of an-
other's relative ignorance, whether real or potential, which
brings us back to Cicero, Antipater, and Professor Levmore.
Those who found their moral theory attractive will not have
gotten this far.
A first cousin of the equal access theory is the view that in-
sider stock trading is unfair because it is akin to a casino game
in which insiders have a percentage advantage and outsiders
are therefore systematically harmed.125 In an analysis that has
proved very influential, 121 Professor Scott contends that this ar-
gument has "surprisingly little substance"1 27 when viewed ex
ante from the perspective of the market rather than ex post from
the perspective of an individual trader. Investors are fully
aware of the possibility of insider trading and will not partici-
pate in the market unless they are compensated for the non-
diversifiable risk they bear by potentially trading against insid-
ers with superior information. 128 It is true that this will mean an
across-the-board reduction in share prices, which may be an
undesirable economic consequence, but that is not an argu-
ment about fairness, but about "whether a lower level of risk
and uncertainty would benefit the society as a whole."' 29 That
turns on whether the decrease in share prices is outweighed by
the incentives to produce valuable information, efficient stock
pricing, and efficient managerial compensation that insider
trading might provide. 30 The merit of Professor Scott's argu-
ment is perhaps best measured by the subsequent disappear-
ance from the literature of "harm to outside shareholders" as a
moral (as opposed to economic) ground for disapproving of in-
sider stock trading.
125. See Scott, supra note 16, at 807-08.
126. Professors Carlton and Fischel claim that it is "in some sense a complete re-
sponse to the claim that investors are exploited by insider trading." Carlton & Fischel,
supra note 16, at 881. It is also endorsed in Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 325.
127. Scott, supra note 16, at 809.
128. ME at 808-09.
129. Id at 809.
130. Professor Scott concludes that any gains from a rule prohibiting insider stock
trading would be far outweighed by these efficiencies and the rule's enforcement costs.
See id- at 809-14.
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III. INSIDER TRADING AS THEFT
Another way to distinguish informational advantages on
which it is moral to trade from those on which it is not is by
reference to the manner in which the advantages were ac-
quired. Rather than focussing on the state of the world-
whether there is equality of information or of access to infor-
mation between the parties-this approach concentrates on the
process by which the present state of affairs was reached.
3 1
A. Toward a Property Rights Approach to Insider Trading
In his treatise on contract law, Verplanck made reference to
the conflicting intuitions produced by a case like Laidlaw v. Or-
gan. Taking advantage of ignorance looks like dirty pool at first
glance. But when one focuses on cases in which superior infor-
mation was acquired by skill, effort, or intelligence, an insis-
tence on full disclosure seems troubling indeed, 13 2 not merely
because of the clear economic consequences of restricting the
ability to profit from information gained through a deliberate
search (rather than theft or casual discovery),13 3 but from a
moral standpoint as well. Does morality really require "that
before I can deal with my indolent neighbor, I should commu-
nicate to him all my private plans, my long-sighted views of the
future state of the market, my surmises-in short, all the results
of that knowledge and address which have been the hard
earned acquisitions of my own industry and activity?"' 3 4 Pro-
fessor Titus and Peter Carroll have played on the same intu-
itions in the context of insider stock trading, noting that "we
rarely begrudge persons the opportunity to trade upon infor-
mational advantages developed through their own lawful in-
dustry and effort,"' 3 5 but do begrudge them the opportunity to
trade on information obtained by unjust or improper means. 13
Information obtained by chance or luck is harder to deal with
131. The distinction between "historical" and "end-result" principles of justice is
attributable to R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 153-55 (1974).
132. See G. VERPLANCK, supra note 40, at 7-11, 75-78.
133. See Kronman, supra note 40, at 12-18.
134. G. VERPLANCK, supra note 40, at 9.
135. Titus & Carroll, supra note 16, at 133-34. See also Aldave, supra note 16, at 122
("We would probably agree that anyone is entitled to exploit any information that he
has developed through special insight or diligent effort"). Professor Keeton, whom
Professor Titus and Mr. Carroll cited, took essentially the same view with respect to
contract law in general. See Keeton, supra note 40, at 25-26.
136. See Titus & Carroll, supra note 16, at 133.
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intuitively,'" 7 but they make the call in favor of a legal (and
hence, one assumes, a moral) duty to disclose.
If one assumes that an affirmative justification for allowing
trading on superior information must be found,' then the ex-
ercise of skill or the expenditure of effort is an understandable
candidate for that role. But it appears to be only a first approxi-
mation of what the Verplankian intuition is driving at. Skill and
effort alone are plainly not enough, as Chiarella demonstrates.
Mr. Chiarella was employed by Pandick Press, a financial
printer which produced, among other things, announcements
of corporate takeovers. Pandick's customers understandably
wanted their identities and those of the targets to be kept secret
in advance of the announcement, so when the documents were
first set for printing, the names of the relevant companies were
concealed by codes or blank spaces. Mr. Chiarella was able to
deduce the correct names from the context and the number of
letters coded or left blank, and (at least until he was caught,
fired, and prosecuted) successfully traded on this information.
Mr. Chiarella's uncovering of the concealed identities of the ac-
quirors and targets in the merger announcements sent to his
employer may well have been a feat of skill and diligence un-
matched in the annals of financial printing, but all of the writers
who emphasize skill and effort would roundly condemn his
conduct. And suppose a person works hard for his information
and then gives or sells it to his worthless nephew. Is it wrong
for the nephew to reap trading profits because he did nothing
tangible to earn the information, and indeed may have done
nothing useful or productive in his entire life? The answer is
surely that the relevant skill and effort is not that of Mr.
Chiarella or the nephew, respectively, but of the client and the
producer. In other words, what really drives this view is a the-
ory of property rights in information, with skill and effort serv-
137. Compare Aldave, supra note 16, at 122-23 (we generally do not begrudge others
the use of information obtained by luck) with Keeton, supra note 40, at 26 (legal duties
of disclosure should more readily be imposed with respect to information "obtained by
mere chance and not because of any exceptional knowledge, skill, or effort"); see also
Titus & Carroll, supra note 16, at 134 (complaining of conflicting intuitions).
138. The unstated assumption that insider stock trading must be affirmatively justi-
fied runs through much of the literature. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 11, at 408, 410.
Professor Painter assumes it openly: "Since Manne's demonstration that insider trad-
ing does little harm to the investor is, if anything, only of neutral significance, some
more affirmative policy reasons must be given to justify insider trading." Painter, supra
note 11, at 149. Why the burden of either proof or persuasion should be on the de-
fender of insider trading is not obvious to me.
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ing not as a necessary or relevant characteristic of the particular
trader at the time of the trade, but at most as a means for deter-
mining who initially acquired the moral right to use and dis-
pose of the information.
The property rights approach has become increasingly popu-
lar as a means for analyzing the economics of insider trading,
but it has a normative side as well. In an influential article,
Professors Carlton and Fischel argue that under a wide range
of conditions, insider trading is economically efficient and thus
increases the size of the corporate pie, just as do efficient mana-
gerial salaries or bonuses. Hence, "shareholders would volun-
tarily enter into contractual arrangements with insiders giving
them property rights in valuable information." 13 9 While this is
framed as an economic argument that is consistent with in-
dependent notions of fairness,' 40 it can sensibly be understood
as a claim that a transaction is fair if it represents the outcome
of a voluntary allocation of property rights. A contractual anal-
ysis, in other words, suggests a conception of fairness in stock
trading that depends upon the means by which information is
acquired. Legal theories based on this conception have sur-
faced under the generic name of "misappropriation" theories,
indicating that the wrong involved is trading on information
obtained by some improper or illegal means.'
4 1
Professor Macey has openly defended such a theory in nor-
mative terms. 142 He contends that information morally belongs
to the person or entity that created it, so that if a corporation
creates information regarding a takeover, it has every right to
139. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 16, at 882.
140. Id. at 881-82.
141. Four Supreme Court Justices endorsed such a theory of Rule 1Ob-5 liability in
Chiarella. See 445 U.S. at 239 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 239-40
(Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.);
and the SEC advanced it forcefully in Carpenter v. United States, where it garnered four
votes. See Brief for the United States at 35-49, Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct.
316 (1987). Academics, like the Court, are split on the question. Compare Aldave, supra
note 16, at 124 ("The misappropriation theory provides a logical and coherent frame-
work") with Warren, supra note 16, at 1248 ("The misappropriation theory.., works a
serious distortion of rule 10b-5 jurisprudence"). Cf Macey, supra note 16, at 47-63
(noting that the misappropriation theory is in tension with doctrines governing stand-
ing, damages, enforcement, and disclosure obligations, and preferring the theory to
the doctrines).
142. Professor Aldave also gives an explicit moral defense of a misappropriation the-
ory, arguing that it "comports well with our intuition about what is wrong with trading
on nonpublic information." Aldave, supra note 16, at 122. However, unlike Professor
Macey, she grounds that intuition in the equal access concerns emphasized by Profes-
sor Brudney. See id. at 123.
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use that information as it sees fit, including giving the right to
trade on that information to its employees as part of their com-
pensation and prohibiting its use by others.' 43 The source of
this moral right (and hence the moral wrong of misappropria-
tion) is ambiguous. After invoking a Lockean theory under
which creators of wealth are ethically entitled to possess it, 14 4
Professor Macey then proceeds to frame his discussion in terms
of the functional role of property rights in promoting economic
efficiency and wealth creation.' 4 5 When discussing appropriate
legal rules, Professor Macey makes sole reference to what can
broadly be called wealth-maximization concerns, 46 focusing
entirely on encouraging the production of valuable informa-
tion.' 47 Professor Macey's mixing of legal and moral concerns
makes it difficult to distinguish the two in his argument, but
what appears to emerge from his discussion is a qualified moral
case against using someone else's property right without con-
sent,' 48 and moral sanction of trading on the basis of informa-
tion that one has properly acquired.
Before pursuing the normative aspects of a property rights
approach further, some important features of such an approach
should be emphasized. First, on a property rights view, trading
on stolen information is only secondarily wrong; the principal
wrong is the theft. Second, one must keep separate two very
different propositions: that it is morally wrong to trade on in-
formation that does not belong to you, and that it is morally
right to trade on information that does. The first, which
amounts to "Theft is wrong," is as close to an uncontroversial
moral proposition as one is going to get. People will disagree
about what constitutes theft, but as long as some conception of
143. See Macey, supra note 16, at 28-29. See alo Morgan, supra note 5, at 100 (analysts
who create new information ought to be regarded as the owners of that information).
144. See Macey, supra note 16, at 28 & n.98.
145. See id. at 28-33.
146. See id. at 28 n.98 ("Locke's analysis is particularly appropriate here because a
corporation that makes a tender offer expends great resources to do so .... [The
existence otirules prohibiting insiders from trading decreases the production of such
information"); idt at 30 ("Legal rules should be developed that insure the optimal pro-
duction of information"); id. at 32 ("The legal system need not assign property rights
in, information in ways that do not maximize society's welfare").
147. See id. at 36-37. Professor Macey notes that distributional considerations, while
perhaps relevant in other contexts, have never been thought sufficient to sustain rules
against insider trading. See id. at 32-33 n. 115.
148. The qualification pertains to trading on information that could not be the sub-
ject of a legal contract, such as information concerning a corporation's fraudulent ac-
tivities. See id at 39-41.
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ownership is accepted as valid, the wrongfulness of theft fol-
lows for all but the most dogged noncognitivists. The second
proposition-that it is morally right to trade on information
that you own-is another matter. A eudaimonist, at least, while
perhaps not wishing to deny a person the legal right to trade
on his information, would hardly say that any noninvasive use
he chooses to make of it is morally right. One can always mis-
use one's assets, whether they be talents or information. For
those who accept this distinction, a property rights approach
will at most mark out a class of transactions that is clearly
wrongful, but will not preclude further moral criticism of in-
sider trading that passes this first line of attack.
B. A Lockean Theory of Insider Trading149
The central issue for a property rights approach to the ethics
of insider trading is to identify who owns the relevant informa-
tion. Verplank's intuitive view that emphasizes the role of skill
and effort in the acquisition of information draws on a powerful
tradition associated most prominently with John Locke and his
labor theory of property rights: Self-owning persons acquire
exclusive rights to property by mixing their labor with the re-
sources of nature.150 However, the only prior writer on insider
trading explicitly to invoke Locke is Professor Macey, who does
so with respect to information concerning takeovers. The of-
feror has a right to information concerning its own plans, he
says, "because a corporation that makes a tender offer expends
great resources to do so. Information that a target company is
an appropriate target may be said to exist in a 'state of nature,'
149. The term "Lockean" is used here in a loose, almost poetic sense to denote any
theory of property rights that involves principles of acquisition, possession, and
exchange that fall roughly within the tradition of classical liberalism. It does not refer
to the specific theory advanced by John Locke, and in particular does not necessarily
encompass Locke's theological assumptions or his qualification that appropriation of
goods from the state of nature is proper only if as good and as much is left for others.
There is much to be said for reserving the term "Lockean" for theories that do directly
harken back to John Locke, but the term has come to signify (with no adequate
substitute) a whole tradition, much as the terms "Kantian" and "Marxist" no longer
necessarily refer to positions advanced by Kant or Marx, or even positions consistent
with their views. Cf. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL SrUD.
103, 104 n.4 (1979) ("I ... [use] the term 'Kantian' to refer to a family of related ethical
theories that, rejecting any form of consequentialism, instead premise themselves on
notions of human autonomy and self-respect. Such theories need not resemble very
closely the thought of Immanuel Kant"); Tushnet, Is There is a Marxist Theory of Law?, 26
NoMos 171, 185 (1983) (justifying a metaphorical use of the term "Marxist").
150. SeeJ. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 16-30 (Peardon ed. 1952).
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to use Locke's analysis."' 5 1
Professor Macey's invocation of the Lockean appropriation
principle invites elaboration.'5 2 Suppose that company A de-
termines that B is an appropriate target for a takeover by A.
Shortly thereafter, C, an investment analyst, independently
comes to the same conclusion, based on his general knowledge
of the relevant markets and publicly disclosed information con-
cerning the two firms. If the information concerning B's target
status is literally in a "state of nature," then by the Lockean
theory A appears to have appropriated that information when it
first discovered it through effort. If C then trades on that infor-
mation, even after independent discovery, it seems that he is an
interloper.
This result, however, is an illusion, which is dissolved by
close attention to the meaning of "information." Information,
or knowledge, does not exist independently of human cogni-
tion. Facts exist, but facts do not become information until
they are grasped by a human mind. A's information concerning
B's target status (or, more precisely, the information possessed
by those persons working on behalf of A) is not, strictly speak-
ing, the same good as C's information, precisely because it is
the information of A rather than of C. Put another way, infor-
mation is inherently relational, and is therefore always at least
in part a human creation. This creative aspect is the Lockean
basis 153 for property rights in information. Indeed, it does
traditional Lockeanism one better. Information is not merely
appropriated by people from a state of nature; people affirma-
tively bring it into being ex nihilo. This can be seen most clearly
with respect to information concerning a person's own plans,
which obviously does not exist until the person generates it,
but the principle is applicable to all information.
This analysis provides a clear basis for assessing the moral
propriety of trading on information that is acquired "casually"
rather than from extended effort or deliberate search. Under
close examination, the distinction between casually and delib-
erately acquired information breaks down. It always requires
151. Macey, supra note 16, at 28 n.98. The Lockean view of property rights also
seems to be implicit in the argument of Professor Morgan. See Morgan, supra note 5, at
100.
152. These remarks should be viewed as tentative explorations and not as a fully-
developed theory of property rights in information.
153. See supra note 149.
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some effort to assimilate data into usable form. Without the
human act of assimilation, the information never exists, just as
an apple sitting on a tree is not an economic good until some
person becomes aware of its potential uses.1 54 In sum, it would
be wrongful for C to use A's knowledge without A's consent,
but not to use knowledge independently formed from an exam-
ination of objective facts. 55
One of the uses that owners are traditionally able to make of
their property is to transfer it to others.15 6 Hence, once infor-
mation has been properly acquired, the owner is entitled to sell
it or give it away. Similarly, he is entitled to enter into contin-
gent agreements for the transfer of future information he may
acquire through creation or contract. For example, those who
form a corporation or other collective economic entity can be
viewed as agreeing that any resources, including information,
created by them in the course of conducting the entity's affairs
will be disposed of in accordance with the terms of the collec-
tive agreement. Employees of the firm can also be seen as ex-
changing the prospective fruits of their creation for some other
value-perhaps a fixed, and hence more certain, salary. From
explicit or tacit agreements of this kind, the firm acquires a
property right in the information generated in the course of its
business. The firm, in turn, is then entitled to dispose of that
information as it wishes, subject to whatever limitations are im-
154. The fact that some human action is always necessary to convert objects (or
facts) into goods means, as a practical matter, that a Lockean theory and a "first posses-
sion" theory will not materially differ. Whoever creates information will necessarily
also be the first to possess it. For reasons not relevant here, a first possession analysis is
analytically superior, notwithstanding the protestations of Professors Alexander and
Schwarzschild that "the first possession principle is a ludicrous candidate for an ulti-
mate moral principle." Alexander & Schwarzschild, Liberalism, Neutrality, and Equality of
Welfare vs. Equality of Resources, 16 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 85, 87-88 (1987). If first possession
is truly taken as an "ultimate" principle, then it is indeed woefully inadequate and inde-
terminate, as well as absurd. But as a social manifestation of a more basic moral theory
(for example, eudaimonism), which can circumscribe its boundaries and give it content
in dubious cases, the first possession principle can be a rule of great power. Professors
Alexander and Schwarzschild are correct to note that these "necessary supplemental
premises," id. at 88, have yet to be provided. They will still be correct when this article
concludes.
155. See Morgan, supra note 5, at 100:
[T]he analyst who combines public information and company interviews to set
forth an analysis and reach conclusions has not usurped or stolen anything; he
or she has created new information-the analysis and conclusions-based on
other information that he or she was given or that was already in the public
domain.
(footnote omitted)
156. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936).
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posed by the network of contracts comprising it. It can with-
hold it, trade upon it, or sell or give it back to some of its
employees or shareholders.
The moral inquiry with respect to insider stock trading thus
centers on where the network of contracts between the firm
and its shareholders, suppliers, lawyers, accountants, invest-
ment bankers, printers, and so on, places the right to trade on
the information.15 7 Locating the right may be a difficult prob-
lem whenever the contracting parties have not specifically ad-
dressed the question, as will often be the case. But it is the sort
of problem that lawyers are familiar with, and the way to solve
it is clear enough: One tries to approximate what the parties
would have said had they spoken. 5 8 If one assumes that per-
sons who form a corporation intend, unless they state other-
wise, to maximize the value of the economic entity, then it
makes sense to choose a default rule in interpreting their con-
tracts that allocates a right to trade on inside information to
managers (or whoever) whenever it would maximize the value
of the firm to do so, perhaps by substituting insider trading
profits for less efficient compensation devices. Determining
when that is the case may be a complicated inquiry, but it is
hardly an impossible one, as the impressive efforts of recent
scholars demonstrate.' 59 The principal danger is placing too
narrow a focus on economic efficiency. If moral opposition to
insider trading, whether reasoned or unreasoned, is truly wide-
spread, then it is possible that shareholders, if specifically asked
about it, would refuse to allow insiders to trade even when it
was demonstrably efficient to do so. Admittedly, there is no
credible evidence to suggest that shareholders are willing to
pay good money to indulge whatever moral aversion to insider
trading they may have,' 6 ' but if one is serious about interpret-
ing contracts to achieve what the parties would have done had
they considered all relevant issues, then one must at least look
157. The same principles should govern an inquiry into the ethics of insider trading
in other contexts. Neither the Alexandrian grain merchant nor the owner of the defec-
tive house stole their information. While nondisclosure may be wrong in either case, it
is not wrong because of any act of misappropriation.
158. Concededly, this is a debatable view of the purposes of contract law. I assume it
here. See generally Barnett, A Consent Theoy of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
159. See, e.g., Haddock & Macey, supra note 16 (shareholders will want to allow in-
sider trading whenever someone other than themselves would otherwise reap the bene-
fits of the firm's information).
160. See Dooley, supra note 5, at 44-47.
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to see whether such evidence exists.16
The property rights approach provides a basis for assessing
the conduct of Mssrs. Boesky, Levine, and Chiarella. All, to put
it bluntly, are crooks. Mr. Chiarella was specifically instructed
by his employer not to trade on information about his client's
plans-a condition that the clients were free to require of their
printer. Mr. Levine's clients similarly did not agree that Drexel
Burnham Lambert employees would be free to trade on valua-
ble information that they disclosed in order to allow the invest-
ment banker to perform its job, and one would strongly
surmise that they intended that no such trading would take
place. 162 Mr. Levine was thus a garden-variety thief, and Mr.
Boesky, who traded on the information and split the profits
with Mr. Levine, was a fence. It is not clear why clients of in-
vestment bankers need a federal agency to protect their inter-
ests when state law would seem to fit the bill quite well, but as a
moral matter, at least, Mr. Boesky and Mr. Levine deserve their
infamy.
On the other hand, the more pedestrian cases of managers
or directors trading on information about their firms (or on in-
formation about other firms acquired from insiders of those
firms) are more problematic. Automatic condemnation of such
trading is appropriate on a property rights view only if there is
good reason to believe that all corporate employment contracts
contain tacit prohibitions on insider trading. That is a large
claim, and one that is unlikely on its face. Without entering into
the economic debates that have occupied the attention of most
second-wave writers, the most likely answer is surely that some
contracts are best read to forbid such trading and some to per-
mit it.16 3 One can argue about where presumptions ought to
161. This point was first made by Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 67.
162. If information about a prospective takeover leaks out, the price of the target
company's stock will likely rise, which may increase the price that the acquiring com-
pany will ultimately have to pay if it is also engaging in open-market purchases in ad-
vance of the takeover. More importantly, it may tip off the target, giving it additional
opportunities to organize defensive tactics. The activity of Mr. Boesky and Mr. Levine,
in addition directly to increasing the demand for the target stocks, might (so the Drexel
clients could have believed) have increased the risk of such leakage. On the other hand,
it may be to the acquiror's advantage to have selected arbitrageurs tipped off, on the
assumption that once they have acquired target stock, they will help to assure that the
takeover is consummated. See Wall St. J., May 19, 1987, at 3, col. 2. I know of nothing
to suggest that the Boesky-Levine transactions were of this latter variety.
163. See Haddock & Macey, supra note 16, at 1450-51, 1467.
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lie, but this is not an area in which one would naturally expect
to find all-or-nothing answers.
The problems with the Lockean property rights approach,
whether based on principles of acquisition by creation or on
first possession, are legion. Why initially assume self-owner-
ship?"6 Why not assume that all assets, including all persons
and their talents, skills, and efforts, constitute a common
fund?a" 5 How can unilaterally mixing one's labor with any-
thing, or getting to an item first, confer rights against the rest
of the world?16 6 With respect to tangible goods, how much la-
bor or possession is needed to confer ownership? Is visual con-
tact or mental contemplation enough (these are surely ways of
putting resources to human uses)? 167 Does a defect in the chain
of title based on a long-past misappropriation taint all subse-
quent titles? What, in other words, is the baseline for assessing
the morality of future contractual exchanges? And what are the
moral-and, importantly, the epistemological and metaphysi-
cal-foundations for a Lockean, or any other, theory of natural
property rights?' 68 Those who believe, as I do, that something
like a Lockean or first-possession approach flows from eudai-
monism have sought to address at least some of these ques-
tions; 169 I will not explore here whether they have done so
successfully. 170 At the very least, the property rights approach
164. See Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. Rnv. 1221, 1227 (1979).
165. See Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L. J. 472, 493 (1980).
166. See Epstein, supra note 164, at 1227-28.
167. See Alexander & Schwarzschild, supra note 154, at 88.
168. See Scheffler, Natural Rights, Equality, and the Minimal State, 6 CAN.J. PHIL. 59, 62
(1976).
169. See T. MACHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN LIBERTIES (1975); Machan, supra
note 85; Machan, A Reconsideration of Natural Rights Theory, 19 AM. PHIL. Q. 61 (1982);
Mack, Egoism and Rights Revisited, 58 PERSONALIST 282 (1977); Egoism and Rights, supra
note 87; Rasmussen, supra note 87.
170. One point, though, can be made without straying too far. Professor Kronman
has argued that all such efforts to defend a theory of libertarian rights are doomed,
because claims of right that invoke individual liberty can be justified only by "deploying
a contestable theory that cannot itself be verified or disproven by simply looking to see
what is the case." Kronman, supra note 165, at 483-84 (footnote omitted). That is, the
concept of individual liberty, which must be defined if talk of libertarian rights is to be
useful, necessarily draws its meaning from a disputable and disputed evaluative frame-
work, and "[t]he question which is the 'best' definition is thus open to argument. The
libertarian's failure to provide such an argument for his definition of individual liberty
is criticized in [Scanlon, Nozick on Rights, Liberty, and Property, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 3
(1976)]." Kronman, supra note 165, at 483 n.29. First, the essential contestability of
rights claims is, to put it simply, contested by many libertarians of a eudaimonistic
stripe, who reject the epistemological roots of Professor Kronman's theory of contest-
ability. Second, Professor Scanlon did not generically criticize "[tihe libertarian's" fail-
ure to proyide an adequate account of individual liberty; he criticized a particular
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provides a coherent way of thinking about insider trading, and
of singling out an identifiable class of transactions for moral
disapproval.
C. Property and Efficiency
It is perhaps surprising to discover that no previous writers
have actually advanced a Lockean moral theory of insider trad-
ing. It is true that many commentators have stated that insider
stock trading should be understood in terms of the contractual
allocation of property rights in information between firms and
individuals.7 1  But none, including Professor Macey, have
sought to ground property rights in a natural rights framework
of acquisition and exchange. After an initial reference to Locke,
Professor Macey argues for legal rules "structured in such a
way as to create incentives for individuals to use resources effi-
ciently." 172 Even the right of the acquiring corporation to pre-
vent others from using its knowledge of its own impending
tender offer is ultimately grounded in the need to "provide the
proper incentive for corporations to 'create' the information by
conducting research activities." 17'  The other principal advo-
cates of a property rights approach-Professors Carlton and
Fischel, Judge Easterbrook, and Professor Manne-have simi-
larly urged efficient allocations of property rights, so that even
if their arguments are recast in normative terms to reflect ethi-
cal disapproval of theft, their positions are not Lockean even in
the loosest sense of that term.' 74
libertarian's failure to do so-a failure which that libertarian openly acknowledged. See
R. NozicK, supra note 131, at xiv.
This latter point is symptomatic of the tendency of legal scholars to treat Robert
Nozick as representative, if indeed not exhaustive, of libertarian thought. It is a bad
tendency. First, libertarianism is a sufficiently diverse viewpoint that trying to select a
single representative is a dubious undertaking. Second, if one must be selected, Profes-
sor Nozick, whose influence within libertarian circles is in fact quite small, is an odd
choice. Tibor Machan, for example, has spent nearly two decades tirelessly addressing
the ethical and epistemological questions that Professor Nozick is so often criticized for
passing over. See generally Machan, Considerations of the Libertarian Alternative, 2 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103 (1979), which makes many of these points. (Professor Kronman
also cites Professors Hayek, Buchanan, and Epstein as libertarians, see Kronman, supra
note 165, at 473 n.8, none of whom would shun the label, but all of whom are probably
better denoted as classical liberals).
171. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 16, at 861-65; Haddock & Macey, supra note
16, at 1463-67; Macey, supra note 16, at 27-32; Law Professors, supra note 12, at 579-81;
Morgan, supra note 5, at 94-101.
172. Macey, supra note 16, at 31.
173. Id. at 28 n.98.
174. Because these are discussions of legal policy, it is possible that some of these
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Obviously, if a system of property rights based on natural law
is efficient, the practical difference between a Lockean and an
efficiency-based property rights approach is minimal. 175 The
conceptual difference, however, is enormous. Professor Ma-
cey's legal inquiry focuses on means of "[a]ssigning [p]roperty
[r]ights in [i]nformation,"' 76 which he thinks should be em-
ployed to encourage the production of valuable information.
Professor Manne, in turn, chastises some of his critics for fail-
ing to recognize that "property is no more nor less than the
rights and obligations recognized by law."' 177 This talk of "as-
signing" rights is anathema to Lockeans. In the natural rights
tradition, at least some property rights exist, as the name sug-
gests, by virtue of nature, not by the grace of the law. Legal
institutions can enforce or fail to enforce those rights, but the
rights exist whether the law assigns them to their rightful pos-
sessors or not. In other words, the Lockean response to Profes-
sor Macey's claim that the law "need not assign property rights
in information in ways that do not maximize society's wel-
fare"'17 is, "If natural rights and society's welfare are in con-
flict, oh, yes, it does."
There is a grand irony in the efficiency approach to insider
stock trading. Those who adopt it are often viewed by their
critics as ardent champions of insider trading, because they
generally would permit corporate insiders to trade profitably
when it is efficient to do so (and the shareholders have not said
otherwise). They are also often seen as opponents of morality,
in both a normative and a positive sense. But determining the
allocation of property rights, and therefore at least in part the
morality of insider trading, by reference to the maximization of
society's welfare, involves the same form of reasoning that
Antipater used to condemn all insider trading. Antipater ar-
gued that it is the moral duty of every individual to serve
society. Efficiency theorists agree; they merely take a macrocon-
writers would prefer a Lockean approach in the abstract, but think it more likely to fall
on deaf ears than an appeal to efficiency. This kind of slippage is unavoidable whenever
legal and ethical analyses are merged.
175. See R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 5 (1985) ("libertarian and utilitarian justifications of individual rights .... prop-
erly understood, tend to converge in most important cases").
176. Macey, supra note 16, at 37 (emphasis added).
177. Law Professors, supra note 12, at 550 (footnote omitted). See also Bainbridge, supra
note 5, at 35 ("The law of insider trading is society's attempt to allocate the property
rights to information produced by a firm.") (footnote omitted).
178. Macey, supra note 16, at 32.
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sequentialist approach to the issue, and conclude that society is
best served by a broader range of insider trading than
Antipater believed. The eudaimonist is equally unhappy in
either case.
IV. INSIDER TRADING AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES
All of the arguments considered thus far can be applied to
trading on superior information concerning any commodity;
there is nothing special about stocks from'the standpoint of
either the egalitarian, equal access, or property rights ap-
proaches. It is possible, however, to construct moral arguments
against some forms of insider trading that are more narrowly
tailored to the stock trading context. Common law rules gov-
erning insider stock trading often distinguish face-to-face
transactions between insiders and shareholders from imper-
sonal transactions on exchanges: Courts have been much more
willing to find duties to disclose in the former situation than in
the latter.'79 This is not surprising, as in face-to-face deals
moral questions can arise from the relationship between the
traders as well as from the character of the transaction. Trust-
ees, for example, have both moral and legal obligations of dis-
closure when dealing with their beneficiaries; indeed, labels
such as "trustee," "agent," and "fiduciary" serve in part to
identify just those relationships that carry such obligations.1 s0
Some early moral objections to insider stock trading seem to
have been based on the premise that corporate officers and di-
rectors are fiduciaries with respect to their shareholders, and
therefore owe both legal and moral duties of disclosure, at least
in transactions where both parties are known to each other."8 '
This fiduciary notion was one of the themes emphasized in the
legislative history of section 10(b);182 it surfaced in some of the
early cases imposing limited duties of disclosure on corporate
insiders; 83 and it was touched on by Professor Brudney.' 4
More recently, Professor Anderson has explicitly framed the
179. See supra note 5.
180. See C. FRIED, CoNTRAcT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTACruA. OBLIGATION
84 (1981).
181. Lake, supra note 17, at 444; Wilgus, supra note 17, at 297.
182. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934) ("men charged with the
administration of other people's money must not use inside information for their own
advantage").
183. See supra note 19.
184. See Brudney, supra- note 16, at 343-44.
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moral issue in fiduciary terms, suggesting that the unfairness of
insider stock trading
is usually described in terms of betrayal of fiduciary respon-
sibilities or abuse of position, or the use of an illegitimate
trading advantage. In other words, the intuitive objection to
insider trading is based not on the failure to disclose to a
particular individual but on the general practice of using cor-
porate information for personal benefit.' 8
5
Professor Anderson's thesis recasts somewhat the traditional fi-
duciary conception; under her formulation, those wronged by
insider trading are not the individual investors with whom the
insider deals, but "the whole class of shareholders, investors,
or clients who reasonably demand that those given access to
valuable information for the benefit of others refrain from en-
gaging in self-dealing or using the information to take unfair
advantage of those very persons who placed them in their privi-
leged positions."'8s This recasting is necessary if the fiduciary
principle is to have the bite one suspects its proponents would
like. If limited to the relationship between officers or directors,
and shareholders (or officers or directors, and firms), it says
nothing about the morality of insiders selling to uninformed
outsiders who are not shareholders, or about non-employees
such as Mr. Chiarella and Mr. Boesky buying from uninformed
shareholders, even in face-to-face transactions.
The expanded fiduciary notion, however, appears to be more
a rationalization than a rationale. The key question, as Profes-
sor Anderson has framed the issue, is to determine when a de-
mand that persons refrain from using information to their
personal advantage is reasonable. The utility, if any, of a fiduci-
ary principle is that it purportedly provides some independent
means of determining when this demand represents a legiti-
mate expectation. If instead there is said to be a fiduciary duty
whenever the expectation is legitimate, then the fiduciary prin-
ciple is a mere label for a conclusion reached through some
other substantive moral principle.
Even when limited to its traditional context, in which there is
185. Anderson, supra note 16, at 353-54 (footnote omitted).
186. Id. at 373. It is not clear whether this passage reflects Professor Anderson's own
views or is merely a description of what she believes Professors Brudney and Dooley's
position to be. Cf Wimberly, supra note 16, at 224-30 (advocating corporate recovery
of insider trading profits based on the insider's fiduciary relationship to the
corporation).
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a fiduciary relationship between officers or directors and their
corporation (not, one should note, between officers or direc-
tors, and shareholders in their capacity as buyers or sellers of
stock), the fiduciary principle is not a promising vehicle for
moral analysis. The relationship between a corporation and its
employees is governed by contract. Therefore, a fiduciary ap-
proach reduces to a property rights approach: If the contract
forbids the employees from trading, then trading is wrong; if
not, not (unless some other reason for condemning the trans-
action can be found). One could perhaps distinguish the ap-
proaches by arguing that there is something in the insider-firm
relationship that no contract can alter. However, this amounts
either to a very dubious theory of inalienability (it is difficult to
imagine why a firm's right to trade on information about itself
should be inalienable), or to a view that shareholders must be
treated as wards or incompetents, 8 7 which is an odd way to
characterize pension funds and insurance companies, who are
likely to be the uninformed outsiders that the insiders are vic-
timizing. In any event, if shareholders are incompetent to pro-
tect their interests and thus cannot contract away the right to
trade on inside information, it is difficult to understand why
they should be able to enter into valid contracts of any sort.
V. SOME THOUGHTS ON DISTRIBUTION
In a generally sympathetic review of Insider Trading and the
Stock Market, Professor Painter took an essentially sociological
view of insider trading. He emphasized that Professor Manne's
abstract economic analysis, which looks to the effects of insider
trading on conceptually identifiable groups such as outside
shareholders as a class,' 88 was unlikely to move those who con-
ceive of insider, trading rules in investor-specific terms-that is,
as means of protecting "the 'Mrs. Surowitzes' of this world."' 89
This is an important insight. Draw a mental picture of Mrs. Su-
rowitz. Now draw a mental picture of an inside trader. On one
side I would guess is a widow of modest means, with little busi-
187. Professor Manne makes reference to what he calls "the 'bumpkin' theory of
outside shareholders. That is, these people should be treated somewhat as wards in
chancery or profligates who would waste their valuable assets while their needy families
starve and languish at home." H. MANNE, supra note 6, at 8.
188. See id at 3.
189. Painter, supra note 11, at 153-54 (footnote omitted) (referring to Surowitz v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966)).
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ness sense. On the other side is a balding, cigar-chomping ex-
ecutive in an expensive suit, or perhaps a younger sharpy with a
perpetual cynical grin. These caricatures may have no basis in
fact; in the real world, the outsider is likely to be a pension fund
or insurance company and the insider could be a struggling in-
ventor. Nonetheless, while I have no evidence to support it, I
strongly suspect that something like the image I have drawn
drives much of the moral opposition to insider stock trading:
Insiders are rich and strong while outsiders are poor and weak,
and insider stock trading is wrong because it generally transfers
wealth from the poor to the rich.
Professor Macey anticipated this suggestion, pointing out
that "no one has ever suggested either permitting or banning
insider trading on the basis that it serves to transfer wealth
from one group to some other, somehow more deserving
group."' O9 That is essentially true of insider stock trading spe-
cifically,' but one lesson of this inquiry is that insider trading
is in most cases a general question of contract doctrine, not an
issue uniquely pertaining to corporate securities. In that wider
context, those who view contract law as an attractive vehicle for
alleviating what they see as an inequitable distribution of
wealth surely would not exclude regulation of insider trading
from their arsenal.' 92 The equal access objection in particular
may, as noted earlier, be a distributional objection in another
guise. Exploring possible distributional approaches to insider
trading is a task for another day, both because the extent to
which distributional goals motivate opposition to insider stock
trading is purely a matter of speculation and because questions
of distributive justice cannot possibly be addressed here. I
touch on the issue, however, in the hope that those who do
have distributional doubts about insider stock trading will make
them explicit in the future.
190. Macey, supra note 16, at 33 n.115.
191. Professor Weston raised distributional concerns in passing. See Weston, supra
note 11, at 144-45.
192. Professor Kronman suggests that all advantages that some traders have over
others, whether of strength, skill, wealth, or information, can morally be used only
when such advantage-taking will, in the general run of cases, work to the benefit of
those on the short end of the stick. See Kronman, supra note 165, at 478-97. As applied
to insider stock trading, this rule might well approximate the results of a property
rights approach, either efficiency-based or Lockean. In fact, it is a property rights ap-
proach, albeit with an initially odd-sounding allocative principle.
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VI. Is THAT ALL THERE IS?
If one counts noses, the most popular moral argument
against insider trading is none of those discussed above; it is
simply a gut-level expression of disapproval-to use Professor
Manne's term, foot-stamping. 193 The modes of expression are
numerous: "offen[se] [to] the moral sense,''194 "a sense of un-
fairness, '  or "it's just not right."' 96 Professor Manne had lit-
tle patience with these bare assertions of intuitive
disapproval, 97 and he is not alone in complaining about their
imprecision and analytic sterility. 9 8 I share this assessment.
But can these objections really be dismissed that easily? Two
foot-stampers have explicitly raised this question, and while
they have done no more than raise it, their comments amount
to a defense of argument-by-assertion with which all normative
legal scholarship must, at some point, come to grips.
Professor Manne attributed the low quality of discussions of
insider trading prior to his book to the fact that economists had
not paid specific attention to the subject, leaving it to lawyers
and legal scholars unaccustomed to thinking in functional, eco-
nomic terms, and whose analysis would thus naturally "reflect
their notion of the fairness of the transaction simply from the
point of view of the two individuals involved."' 9 9 Professor
Painter argued that this approach, with its emphasis on the
desires and expectations of ordinary investors, is too deeply in-
grained in society and the law for Professor Manne's scientific
analysis to prevail, however superior that analysis may be.200 "
Professor Painter recognized that this "appeal to the con-
science of the community" 201 does not really represent an ana-
193. See supra notes 17-19.
194. Wilgus, supra note 17, at 297.,
195. Brudney, supra note 16, at 346.
196. H. MANNE, supra note 6 at 233 n.42.
197. See supra note 21.
198. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 324 ("I suspect that few people who invoke
arguments based on fairness have in mind any particular content for the term."); Scott,
supra note 16, at 805 ("Judging by the opinions and commentaries, unfairness is one of
those qualities that exists in the eye of the beholder and elicit little effort at
explanation.").
199. H. MANNE, supra note 6, at 3.
200. See Painter, supra note 11, at 155 (techniques of investor protection "cannot
concentrate on the interplay of gross and impersonal economic forces to reach a result
which to the individual is morally indefensible in terms of his normal expectations of
the market place").
201. Id at 159.
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lytic advance over foot-stamping, but he questioned-without
answering-whether any such advance is possible:
But, after all, what is morality? Attempts to provide a "ra-
tional" foundation for moral judgments have a way of being
unconvincing. The whole philosophy of ethical judgments
has a pedantic quality which escapes the ordinary individual
who merely stamps his, [sic] or her foot and declares, inartic-
ulately [sic] that "I don't care, it's just not right." Like Sa-
muel Johnson's reply to the sophistry of Bishop Berkeley,
reactions of this type have a simplicity and immediacy which
make up for their lack of theoretical respectability. Even if
the content of moral statements be primarily emotive, which
is doubtful, a satisfactory morality must be emotionally satis-
fying-that is, must appeal to the multitude who, not being
entrepreneurs, must give implicit approval to the entrepre-
neurs in their insider trading. And Manne's analysis hardly
appears to have achieved that result. However, his great con-
tribution has been to show us that foot-stamping may not be
enough in this area.202
Alone among the second wave commentators, Gerard Wim-
berly unashamedly stamped his feet, grounding ethical opposi-
tion to a broad range of trading practices on "[m]orality, a
modem sense of 'it's just not right,' and a feeling that the di-
rector has no claim to the profits from confidential informa-
tion."' 20 In response to anticipated charges of emotionalism,
Mr. Wimberly answered: "But if emotion is not a proper source
of business ethics, one wonders whence else 'ethics?' "204
It is easy to dismiss Professor Painter and Mr. Wimberly as
"know-nothings." However, their questions about the founda-
tions of moral judgments, irritating as they are, are fair ones.20 5
To criticize someone, whether a law student, a legal scholar, or
a philosophy professor, for merely asserting "I don't care; it's
just not right," one needs to have something more helpful to
offer.
The problem can be framed more generally: If bare asser-
tions of moral outrage are unacceptable argumentation in legal
scholarship, then what is acceptable? When confronted, this
question proves to be distressingly difficult. For starters, it
202. Id. at 159.
203. Wimberly, supra note 16, at 224.
204. I at 224 n.102.
205. As is Professor Leff's: "How can one ground any statement in the form, 'It is
right to do X' in anything other than the quicksand of bare reiterated assertion?" Leff,
Book Review, 29 STAN. L. REV. 879, 880 (1977).
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would surely be acceptable to argue that a particular ethical
proposition can be derived from a provably correct moral the-
ory.2 0 6 Of course, an argument of that kind would have to ad-
dress a number of foundational philosophical issues. For
example, one prerequisite for such an argument is the specifi-
cation of an appropriate epistemological standard for deter-
mining moral truth. That is, we need to know how to recognize
the correct theory when we come across it. The search for
moral truth will take very different paths if one is searching for
deductions from self-evident premises beyond even Descartes's
ability to doubt,20 7 for examples of what is generally thought of
by wise people as the good,208 or for anything in between.
Hence, questions of epistemology are logically prior to ques-
tions of ethics; to determine whether and how ethical truths are
attainable requires a more general theory of human knowledge.
That, in turn, requires consideration of metaphysics-of the
nature of man, his cognitive faculty, and the world in which he
lives. In short, in order to defend normative statements in an
unambiguously adequate fashion, one needs an integrated, val-
idated philosophical system, which can then be brought to bear
on the specific moral question one faces, such as the ethics of
insider stock trading.
The legal writer who successfully applied this method would
not only have written a treatise, but would also be a serious
contender for the title of the greatest philosopher who ever
lived. It requires an impressive feat of philosophical integration
even to incorporate by reference the work of others who one
believes have provided such a system. At a minimum, that re-
quires an independent grasp of the system, down to the level of
metaphysics, sufficient to determine its adequacy. This is not to
say, or even to suggest, that the enterprise of constructing or
recognizing a rational ethical system is impossible in general or
beyond the capacity of legal scholars in particular. Indeed, I
206. This assumes that rational proof of substantive moral propositions is both pos-
sible and meaningful, an issue that philosophers have debated for centuries and that
has increasingly come to the attention of legal scholars. See D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE
RULE OF LAW 11-35 (1984); J. MURPHY & J. COLEMAN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: AN
INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 72-73, 102-06 (1984); Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatu-
ral Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; Leff, supra note 204; Moore, Moral Reality, Wis. L. REV.
1061 (1982).
207. See Descartes, Meditations on the First Philosophy, in THE RATiONALISTS 112-17
(1974).
208. Rightly or wrongly, this method is often attributed to Aristotle. See generally AR-
ISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS Bk. 1 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962).
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emphatically believe the contrary, and even believe that moral
knowledge can satisfy a correspondence as opposed to coher-
ence standard of truth.2" 9 It is only to say that it is a big job,
especially for a lawyer. It is conceivable that the ethical, episte-
mological, and metaphysical problems of the ages will be
solved by an article in a twentieth-century, English-language
law journal. But I rather doubt it.
So, if the hapless lawyer cannot produce in his article a com-
pelling demonstration of moral truth, then what? One possibil-
ity is silence: If you can't prove your normative utterances, they
are no more useful than bare assertions of moral outrage, so
shut up and do something positive and constructive for a
change. But recognizing the practical difficulties (without con-
ceding the theoretical impossibility) of one extreme need not
push us to the other so quickly. Perhaps arguments that are not
themselves compelling can nonetheless serve as useful links in
a longer, even centuries long, chain of knowledge. To make the
case for silence it would be necessary to show that nothing
fruitful can possibly come of normative discourse in the ab-
sence of full-blown philosophical validation of each proferred
proposition. That is unlikely.
So the problem is to find an acceptable kind and level of ar-
gument that is noncomprehensive but nonetheless useful. One
approach is to substitute in place of rational validation such
things as, to take Judge Posner's suggestions, "basic formal cri-
teria of adequacy, such as logical consistency, completeness,
definiteness, and the like,"2 1 consistency with our moral intu-
211itions, or contribution to the survival or prosperity of soci-
ety. 21 2 As Judge Posner recognizes, these standards at most can
only provide a basis for rejecting moral views, not for accepting
them.213 But-that at least is something, and it has in fact been
the usual way in which legal scholarship has dealt with the
209. A correspondence theory of truth conforms to what I suspect most people
outside academia have in mind when they talk about truth: correspondence or agree-
ment with objective facts of reality. A coherence theory makes the criterion of truth
some form of consistency or fit with other propositions. Correspondence theorists can
and do employ coherence arguments; the dispute is over whether there is some ulti-
mate criterion of truth outside the propositional system.
1 210. See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J. LEGAL SrUD. 103, 110
(1979).
211. See id
212. See id. at 110-11.
213. See id. at 110. See alsoJ. MURPHY &J. COLEMAN, supra note 194, at 67 n.65, 101
(discussing how coherence as a criterion can refute but not validate a theory).
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problem of moral justification (when it has dealt with it). More
specifically, the tendency has been to rely heavily on judge Pos-
ner's second criterion: consistency with "widely shared ethical
intuitions." '214 Indeed, Judge Posner and many others see in
this criterion the very raison d'etre for moral theorizing,215 and
writers on insider stock trading appear to have relied on it im-
plicitly. 216 The method differs from foot-stamping, to which it
bears more than a family resemblance, in that particular intu-
itions are not taken for granted, but are analyzed and tested for
consistency with more fundamental ones. The theoretical task
is to derive a framework that accounts for the widest possible
set of our most strongly felt intuitions, that allows conflicts be-
tween intuitions to be resolved in some orderly fashion, and
that can serve as a tool in hard cases where our intuitions are
unclear.
While this does in a sense provide a means of saying less
214. Posner, supra note 210, at 110. A sample of works that explicitly rely, sometimes
with great reluctance, on intuitions as the basis for moral judgment would fill volumes.
The popularity of this approach has no doubt been helped along by the enormously
influential work ofJohn Rawls, who has produced perhaps the most sophisticated ap-
plication of this methodology. See J. RAwLs, supra note 88. Professor Rawls employs a
method of reasoning from moral intuitions in which we have a great deal of confidence
("considered judgments") to a theory that yields those intuitions, and back again to the
initial judgments if the theory required to yield them offends other strongly held intu-
itions. See id. at 19-21, 47-50. There is of course more to it than this, but not all that
much more. Professor Rawls is engaging in a kind of transcendental deduction: we
begin with (provisional) knowledge of certain moral propositions, in the form of con-
sidered judgments, and the task of ethics is to construct a theory that shows how those
judgments are true. He allows the initial considered judgments to be revised as the
theory is developed, but there is nothing to guide that process of revision except other
considered judgments, or perhaps even an aesthetic sense of what a "pleasing" theory
would consist of. Professor Rawls and others may be correct (though I think not) that
that is the best we can do, see id. at 576-81; Moore, supa note 205, at 1112-13, but the
fact remains that calling a moral intuition a "considered judgment" makes it no less of
an intuition unless one can prescribe substantive standards to govern the process of con-
sideration, a possibility that Professor Rawls explicitly rejects. SeeJ. RAwLs, supra note
88, at 578-79. Professor Rawls does claim to have nonarbitrary standards for determin-
ing when an intuitive judgment is a considered one, see id. at 47-48, but those standards
affect only which intuitions serve as the ultimate moral touchstones. It should be noted
that Professor Rawls has specifically cautioned against too hastily using his methodol-
ogy to derive principles of individual conduct rather than historically contingent polit-
ical principles. See RawlsJustice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
223, 224-25, 245 (1985).
215. See Posner, supra note 210, at Il1:
[W]hat is desired in an ethical theory, I believe, is not a basis for abandoning
those fundamental ethical precepts that all of us accept, if not always obey, but
rather a structure which organizes our intuitions and provides guidance in
dealing with ethical issues where our intuitions are uncertain.
See also PHILOSOPHY OF LAw, supra note 194, at 83, 101.
216. For examples of what appear to be intuitionist methodologies, see Aldave, supra
note 16, at 122; Brudney, supra note 16, at 346; Levmore, supra note 16, at 122-23.
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than everything but more than nothing about moral matters,
and I have even tacitly relied on it myself at times, it is a troub-
lesome approach even apart from its substantive limitations.2 17
Its utility depends upon a threshold degree of overlap between
the intuitions of author and audience. If one person intuits X
and another intuits Y, they can engage in advocacy at various
levels, on the assumption that X or Y will be abandoned if
shown to be inconsistent with more basic intuitions, but at
some point the parties will arrive at foundational intuitions that
are not revisable, because they form the baseline against which
other intuitions are judged. Those who plant their feet in dif-
ferent foundations simply have nothing to say to each other.
Intuition-based coherence arguments, in other words, solve the
problem of moral discourse by limiting the audience to those
who agree with a sufficiently broad range of the author's intui-
tive assumptions to avoid the posing of too-embarrassing ques-
tions.2 I8 Moreover, intuitions are not irreducible primaries.
They are reflections of automatized value judgments, which in
turn can be the product of reasoned philosophizing, sloppy
thinking, or social osmosis. 2 19 On the assumption that the for-
mer is relatively uncommon, reliance on intuitions thus creates
a strong bias in favor of whatever values happen to be domi-
nant in the existing culture. Those seeking to challenge a reign-
ing consensus are placed at a serious disadvantage. 220
Even greater problems plague every similar method that
seeks to sidestep substantive questions of right and wrong. If
our answer to the foot-stampers is that, unlike them, "we are
seeking good reasons for one moral position as opposed to
others, ' 221 we have to know what count as good reasons. Is it a
sufficient reason to reject a theory that it leads to conclusions
that are "ethically unacceptable to many of us"? 22 2 If so, one is
back to coherence with intuitions, and the problem of defining
the appropriate "us." Is degree of completeness a reason for
217. See R. HARE, supra note 75, at 12, 40.
218. Cf J. RAWLS, supra note 88, at 580-81 (discussing how justification, as distinct
from formal proof, necessarily proceeds at some level from consensus).
219. See D. LYoNs, supra note 206, at 16.
220. See Baier,Justification in Ethics, 28 NoMos 3, 11 (1986) ("what counts as a refuta-
tion for some, e.g., that the theory has moral consequences which would be rejected by
commonsense morality, would be calmly accepted by others as the inevitable and in-
deed desirable result of moral progress").
221. D. LYONS, supra note 206, at 32.
222. See Hammond, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 1493, 1507 (1982).
780 [Vol. I11
Ethics of Insider Trading
preferring one theory to another? This is a plausible standard
only if any answer, even a wrong one, is preferable to none,
which is hardly obvious. If an ethical system serves as a basis
for decision-making, then gaps in the system will require adop-
tion of some second-order decision method. A complete sys-
tem is only preferable to an incomplete one if there is some
independent reason to think that the additional answers pro-
vided by the more complete theory are better than the answers
yielded by whatever second-order decision method will be used
to supplement the incomplete one. Much the same can be said
of definiteness as a virtue: Is a definite but wrong answer better
than an incomprehensible one? And it is not possible to avoid
forever basic substantive questions about the proper focus of
moral theory. Someone who believes that morality consists of
principles to guide persons in fulfilling their own natural desti-
nies as individuals2 2 will find very different considerations to
be "good reasons" for adopting or rejecting an ethical theory
than someone who believes that a person's act "has no inher-
ent moral value if he acts with the intention of benefiting only
himself. 224
In the end, there is no good substitute for a sound argu-
ment.22 5 Lest the foot-stampers begin celebrating too early,
however, this leads to no more dramatic a conclusion than that
normative discourse in legal scholarship must often be evalu-
ated by standards drawn from sources other than moral theory.
Part of the purpose of writing or speaking is to make one's
thoughts available to others for their use and comment. This
sharing of ideas enhances the likelihood that one's own work
223. See, e.g., D. NORTON, supra note 82; A. RAND, supra note 87.
224. Dworkin, supra note 80, at 211-12.
225. Professor Barnett points out that even if we do not definitively know which
reasons are good ones, "we are not frozen in our tracks until philosophers settle the
question. We must act and evaluate both without ironclad principles and without crite-
ria for evaluating the principles at our disposal." Barnett, Foreword:Judicial Conservatism
v. A PrincipledJudicialActivism, 10 HARV.J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 271, 280 n.19 (1987). But the
need for action does not provide a means for setting aside metaethical questions; it
merely sets the stage for the existentialist, whose central argument is that we are in-
deed condemned to choose in the absence of any demonstrable standards. Professor
Barnett suggests that even without standards "there are both wise and foolish ways to
proceed," id., and that one can profitably look to the knowledge tacitly reposed in us
through "our evolved and ever-evolving traditions." Id That is a metaethical claim of
no small significance. Perhaps on a utilitarian model of ethics the long survival of a
practice would be good evidence of its moral worth, but otherwise reference to tradi-
tions (which traditions?) appears to reduce to an appeal to widely shared moral
intuitions.
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will be advanced and holds out the prospect that others will
better be able to pursue their endeavors in light of one's in-
sights, questions, and errors. Normative discourse can thus be
evaluated as good or bad as writing or discourse at least partially
in terms of how well it achieves these ends. From this perspec-
tive one can derive many of the formal properties often consid-
ered relevant in evaluating competing moral claims-such as
logical consistency, clarity, comprehensiveness, and so on-not
necessarily as moral virtues, but as virtues of legal or moral
writing. This standard at least allows one to criticize and then
ignore writers who express their intuitive judgments about in-
sider trading without even indicating what practices they are
objecting to. Such unfocused foot-stamping is not necessarily
"wrong" on this view, but neither is it in any obvious sense
helpful. Thus, the least one can expect from lawyers in the way
of normative discourse is to be able to understand what they
are discussing.
One can even go further and reject and ignorefocused foot-
stamping. A request for explanation of a moral judgment, pur-
sued relentlessly, will eventually result in a demand for elabo-
ration of a full philosophical system, but a more limited
demand for identification of a normative premise on which the
judgment is based is more easily justified. If I think that a prac-
tice is morally wrong, but have nothing to offer beyond that
observation, it is difficult to see what purpose is served by ex-
pressing that observation. Presumably I am not inviting com-
ment, because by hypothesis there is nothing to comment on
other than a declaration of my mental state. Others can agree
or disagree with my observation, but unless the mere fact of my
belief is somehow relevant (as it would be, for example, to a
moral theory that depends on the number of legal writers who
express views on a subject), no one's intellectual enterprise is
going to be advanced by my outburst, least of all my own. Even
focused foot-stamping, in other words, provides nothing to talk
about; and while that may not be an argument that will impress
moral philosophers, it does constitute a basis for rejecting its
adequacy as legal or moral writing. On the other hand, a sug-
gestion that nothing more than foot-stamping is possible does
advance debate; that is an affirmative proposition whose per-
suasiveness and implications can be explored, and which ex-
presses something more than the mental state of the speaker.
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Things are even better if one can state a premise that underlies
one's moral judgment and can explain what "good reasons"
were found to support it; the implications of that premise can
be explored, and the proferred reasons can be examined by
those who have their own substantive criteria.
Of course, it is open to a foot-stamper to respond that it is
not significantly more interesting to know someone's unproven
premise or theory than to know his emotional reaction to some
not-fully-defined practice. But that means only that one should
not expect all that much in the way of moral wisdom from law-
yers or legal scholars-or, for that matter, from economists,
historians, longshoremen, or anyone else who does not en-
gage, with considerable time and certifiable genius, in the en-
terprise of moral philosophy.226 It is a long leap from that
premise to approval, or even tolerance, of foot-stamping.
VII. CONCLUSION
This analysis has raised many questions and answered few.
That is neither avoidable nor regrettable; ethics, even when
done by lawyers rather than philosophers, is a complicated sub-
ject. Those who find attractive some version of the moral the-
ory of Cicero and Antipater are well on their way to an answer
to the moral question of insider trading, and not just with re-
spect to stocks. Property rights theorists, whether of a Lockean
or social-efficiency bent, have a means of identifying at least
one major class of transactions deserving of moral disapproval:
trading on stolen goods. Beyond that, few conclusions can be
drawn, except that, as with most ethical questions, the moral
approach to insider trading that can attract a clear consensus
has yet to be advanced.
226. There may also be very little cause for expecting much more from moral philos-
ophers. See Baier, supra note 220, at 11 ("Admittedly, commonsense morality does not
provide a clear, unambiguous, and well-grounded method for 'validating' our moral
opinions, but moral theory has done worse") (footnote omitted).
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